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Abstract 
 
Commission Decision of 25 February 2016 setting up a Scientific, Technical and Economic 
Committee for Fisheries, C(2016) 1084, OJ C 74, 26.2.2016, p. 4–10. The Commission may 
consult the group on any matter relating to marine and fisheries biology, fishing gear technology, 
fisheries economics, fisheries governance, ecosystem effects of fisheries, aquaculture or similar 
disciplines. This report further develops the methodologies for the collection and analysis of social 
data in fisheries, to be applied for the collection of social data for the data call 2021 and the 
subsequent analysis and use of these data. Additionally, the report assesses the impact of the 
Common Fisheries Policy Regulation and the implementation of its Articles 5.2 (access to waters) 
and 16 and 17 (fishing opportunities) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 on the social situation of 
small-scale coastal fishers and their communities. 
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SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE FOR FISHERIES (STECF) - Social 
dimension of the CFP (STECF-20-14) 
 
 
Background provided by the Commission 
 
Fisheries throughout Europe have undergone major structural changes, leading to important 
social consequences for both individual fishers as for fishing communities. In several fishing 
communities and regions of the EU, the social importance of the fisheries sector outweighs its 
direct economic contribution. There is an increasing awareness that more attention should be 
paid to the social dimension of fisheries, emphasised by the mission letter of Commissioner 
Sinkevičius explicitly mentioning the need to address the social dimension . 
 
The collection of social indicators for the EU fishing fleet, aquaculture- and fish processing 
industry was introduced by Regulation (EU) No 2017/1004 on the establishment of a Union 
framework for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for 
scientific advice regarding the CFP (EU-MAP). The social variables, to be collected every three 
years from 2018 onwards, are: Employment by gender; Full Time Employment (FTE) by gender; 
Unpaid labour by gender; Employment by age; Employment by education level; Employment by 
nationality; Employment by employment status; Total FTE National. 
 
STECF Expert Working Group (EWG) 19-03 reviewed the social data in the EU fisheries sector 
collected under the Data Collection Framework (DCF / EU-MAP) in 2018, provided an EU level 
overview and national chapters describing the data, and discussed potential improvements and 
refinements in the collection of social data in EU fisheries. The EWG 19-03 report provided a 
comprehensive overview of the social data collected under the EU MAP for the EU fishing sector 
on the social and demographic characteristics of the labour force both at EU and Member States 
level over the year 2017. 
 
 
Request to the STECF 
 
The STECF is requested to: 
1. review the report of the STECF Expert Working Group 20-14, evaluate the findings and 
assess the delivery by the STECF Expert Working Group on the terms of reference and 
make any appropriate comments and recommendations with a view to enhancing STECF 
support to the social dimension of fisheries. 
2. provide recommendations on the next actions to be taken to achieve a sound methodology 
for the analysis of social data allowing for the development of a time-series and trends and 
the use of social data in assessing the social impact of the Common Fisheries Policy as well 
as of envisaged fisheries measures. This in coherence with the work of other STECF 
activities, in particular in the economic area. 
3. pay a particular attention to the possibility of including in such methodology national and 
community profiles, duly taking into account already existing sources and ongoing 
initiatives, for instance those by the ICES working group on social indicators. 
 
 
STECF observations  
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STECF Expert Working Group (EWG) 20-14 was tasked with building upon the findings of EWG 
19-03. The EWG was requested to further develop the methodologies for the collection and 
analysis of social data in fisheries, to be applied for the collection of social data for the data call 
2021 and the subsequent analysis and use of these data. Additionally, the EWG was tasked with 
assessing the impact of the Common Fisheries Policy Regulation and the implementation of its 
Articles 5.2 (access to waters) and 16 and 17 (fishing opportunities) of Regulation (EU) No 
1380/2013 on the social situation of small-scale coastal fishers and their communities.  
 
The EWG 20-14 held a virtual meeting, from the 28th of September until the 2nd of October 
2020. The meeting was attended by 17 invited experts, 3 members of STECF, 1 expert from JRC, 
1 member of the European Commission DGMARE and three observers.  
 
Scope of the work 
STECF notes that the TOR for the work of EWG 20-14 consists of two parts. The first part 
reflected by TORs 1-3, calls for an analysis of impact of the effects on society of policy 
implementation. The second part of the TOR, as reflected by TOR 4 and 5 of the EWG, is more 
closely related to the work implemented by EWG 19-03 and has a focus on further methodological 
development.  
 
STECF notes that this divide in the TORs, between assessment and methodology development, is 
also reflected in the EWG report. Two separate groups worked on the different parts of the TOR. 
Especially feedback between implementation of TORs 1-3 and 4-5, given time restrictions was 
therefore suboptimal. 
 
In order to facilitate the work of the EWG 20-14 the Commission had prior to the meeting issued 
a voluntary questionnaire to the MS which addressed (i) the use of transparent and objective 
criteria including those of an environmental, social and economic nature in allocating the fishing 
opportunities available to them, (ii) the actual criteria used in the allocation of fisheries and the 
methodology applied to underpin these criteria, (iii) the efforts undertaken within the allocation 
system to provide incentives to fishing vessels deploying selective fishing gear or using fishing 
techniques with reduced environmental impact and (iv) whether impact/effectiveness studies 
were carried out for the national allocation system.  
 
STECF acknowledges that 16 MS replied to the questionnaire but observes that the completeness 
of reply varies. The EWG was though able to rely on the additional knowledge and preparatory 
work of the experts present to produce information on, for example, the national system of 
allocating fishing opportunities, the division of fishing opportunities between the SSCF and LSF 
and developments of these over time. During the meeting, experts performed additional analyses 
of EU regulations, especially TAC and quota regulations, additional literature review and expert 
knowledge were also used for the analysis.  
 
STECF observes, from implementation of the assessments under TORs 1-3, that it is apparent 
that, generally, for the assessment of the social impact of fisheries management measures there 
is a lack of quantitative and qualitative data available. To implement the assessment, the 
information obtained to a large extend depended on the input of the available experts. 
 
Additionally, STECF observes that for those instances where quantitative and qualitative data was 
available, there is a clear need of having a national expert available to interpret and assess the 
data in the national and local context.  
 
STECF notes that if the suggestions for National and Community profiling of the fishing sector, as 
recommended under TORs 4 and 5, would be operationalised, this would indeed allow for more 
data and information to become available to implement assessments of the social impacts of 
fisheries management measures.  
 
Findings 
Effects of policy implementation (TOR 1-3) 
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Concerning the analysis of (i) the impact of restrictions put in place by Member States under 
Article 5.2 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, STECF notes that the EWG found no MS reported 
any conflicts regarding the special rule to allow vessels traditionally fishing in the area in the 
territorial waters (6-12 nm) that is foreseen in Art. 5.2. However, the EWG also noted that it was 
not possible to determine whether privileged access to coastal waters (i.e. access limited to 
vessels of the small-scale segments/coastal fisheries, e.g. Plaice Box in the North Sea) has an 
effect on the (economic) development of specific fleet segments. Assessing this would require to 
compare the current situation with a situation without such a restriction. After more than 20 
years of e.g. the Plaice box, the sector has adapted to this situation, and such comparison data 
do not exist. It might be possible, however, to compare via simulation the current situation with a 
situation where the restriction of the Plaice Box would be removed.  
 
Concerning the analysis of Art. 17 how social criteria and criteria based upon the contribution to 
the local economy have been used by MS when allocating the fishing opportunities available to 
them, STECF notes that the EWG found many examples of Member States using social criteria in 
the allocation of fishing opportunities. However, there does not appear to be any clear trend in 
the use of social criteria based on geography, type of fishing opportunity, or political culture. It is 
also clear that not two MS use the same system of allocating fishing opportunities or even the 
same mix of social criteria. 
 
Concerning the analysis of the impact of the national fishing opportunities allocation system on 
the social sustainability of the national fishing sector, and in particular of small-scale coastal 
fishers and their communities, STECF notes that the EWG found that the information provided by 
the MS combined with the knowledge of the available experts was useful for the initial analysis. 
However, the EWG noted that there is a potential difference between the fishing opportunity 
allocation criteria used, the actual quota allocation and the possibilities for fleets to effectively fish 
the quota. National and Community profiles of the fisheries sector could assist over time in more 
clearly analysing the utilisation and impacts of these allocation criteria. 
 
STECF notes that the TORs 1-3 stipulated an analysis of impact of measures and practices in 
general, with a specific focus on the effects on the SSCF segment. Especially the allocation of 
fishing opportunities and the distribution of fishing rights between SSCF and LSF in the Member 
States, and whether rights move from small- to large-scale vessels, needed to be analysed.  
 
STECF observes that although MS may not directly draw a direct line between Art. 17 of the basic 
regulation and their national quota allocation systems, they do use or have used criteria in the 
allocation process which could be labelled as ‘social criteria’ (e.g. a special fisheries fund in 
Denmark for SSCF as percentage of the overall quota). Some of the criteria were already applied 
before the introduction of Art. 17, like historical track record of catches, that may not be 
associated directly with social aspects when implemented, but STECF observes is de facto such a 
criterion, with potentially positive or negative effects on different fleet segments. 
 
STECF observes that to analyse the impact of the system of allocation of fishing opportunities it is 
important that the entire system of fishing opportunities is taken into consideration. For example, 
STECF notes that in analysing allocation of quota (as a means of fishing opportunity allocation) 
between the SSCF and the LSF the allocation should be analysed in combination with access to 
other resources that might be available for small scale fleets, (e.g. non-quota species and access 
rights to specific fishing grounds). Also, the definition of small scale fleets might be different from 
the general EU definition for quota allocation purposes and might be misleading when compared 
between countries, (e.g. in the STECF AER the small scale fleet is defined as vessels <12 using 
passive gears, while for quota distribution the 10m threshold is used by some MS).  
 
Additionally, STECF notes that traditionally in the analysis of differences between impacts of e.g. 
quota allocation schemes on the SSCF and the LSF, the importance of the SSCF is mainly defined 
in terms of the social dimension as being an important contributor to the local community. Yet 
also from an economic perspective the SSCF shows a twice as high productivity in terms of use of 
capital and labour compared to the LSF (as shown in the STECF AER report 20-06). This implies 
that the SSCF’s use of the production factors (capital and labour) is more efficient, derived 
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probably from shorter value chains and a larger focus on quality, while taking advantage of high-
value non-TAC species. 
 
Hence STECF notes that, to analyse impacts of measures, the effects should be considered taking 
the relevant parts of the whole socio-ecological fisheries system into consideration. Additionally, 
there should be a realisation that systems vary widely between MS. To support the analysis 
within and between countries, STECF notes that it is important to provide clear and consistent 
definitions of terms and concepts used. One of the challenges lies in the operationalisation of the 
concepts of reliance and resilience, two key concepts to measure (long term) impacts of policy on 
fishing communities, as defined by EWG 19-03 and ICES WGSOCIAL. Progresses pursued by ICES 
WGSOCIAL for devising a universal definition for these concepts, while providing an appropriate 
methodology to operationalise and quantify these concepts in the national context, may allow for 
operational indicators of social impact comparable between MS to be defined and may be used by 
future STECF EWGs on social data.  
 
Methodological development for data collection and analysis of social data (TOR 4-5) 
STECF notes that in order to facilitate the collection of social data, as part of the 2021 data call, 
there is a need to clarify variables at an early stage in 2021 before MS begin to collect and report 
the next set of social variables. Next to using similar age brackets across for example the Social 
data report, the AER and those used by Eurostat, there is the need for PGECON to devise clear 
operational definitions for issues such as paid vs unpaid labour and the category ‘other income’. 
Specifically, related to the latter, STECF observes it is important to consider that next to having a 
focus on the fishing operation, hence a focus on the vessel owner, his/her enterprise and his/her 
family circumstances, there is also a necessity to consider the circumstances of, for example, 
crew members but also other (family) members relying on the fishing operation. 
 
The EWG advises thus that any new variable to collect should be defined together with the DCF 
Planning Group on Economics Issues (PGECON), using information also from the ICES Working 
Group on Social indicators (WGSOCIAL). STECF endorses the suggestion to define these 
variables, or make significant changes to the definition of existing variables, to be discussed and 
agreed at the social variable subgroup of PGECON planned early in 2021 (a date is not decided 
yet). This group should involve social scientists as well as data collectors and/or end users.  
 
Concerning the development of methodologies for the expansion of the social analysis to include 
national profiles and specific fishing community social profiles, STECF notes that the EWG 
developed a detailed template for the national profiles with a comprehensive list of descriptors, 
and an outline of potential data sources, the majority of which are available at sources such as 
Eurostat, DCF, Eurofound. As for the Community profiles, which is a much more detailed, and 
hence labour intensive, undertaking than the compiling of national profiles, the EWG report 
provides guidance to MS who wish to conduct community profiles. STECF observes the guidelines 
attempt to ensure that community profiling initiatives across Europe address some common 
issues and questions without being overly prescriptive. 
 
STECF observes that the further detailing of National Profiles and Community Profiles has been 
appropriate and has progressed in defining a methodology and format apt for implementation by 
the MS. The National Profiles are understood to depict the national structure of the fishing 
fleet(s), including social, cultural and economic aspects of the fisheries and witnessed trends, 
developments and (social) issues. STECF agrees that the National profile should be updated once 
every three years to have value. STECF notes that the National Profiles should be developed in 
conjunction with data collected under the DCF and as, for example, reported in the AER. 
However, STECF notes that the social profile can provide a more profound description and 
analysis of, for example, the national fishing opportunity allocation system. 
 
STECF observes that the proposed Community Profiles, to be collected once every 5 years for 
selected communities, are a necessary addition to the National Profiles. They will generate data to 
analyse a more long term and more profound impact of measures on the fishing communities. 
STECF notes that the proposed methodology by the EWG for the construction of such Community 
Profiles is appropriate. 
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STECF conclusions  
 
STECF concludes for TOR 1 that the EWG answered the TORs and acknowledges that the analysis 
produced is of a high standard.  
 
STECF concludes that the discussions and the proposals of the EWG 20-14 should be considered 
by the Commission and MS when revising the EU-MAP and developing the social indicators for the 
2021-2022 period.  
 
In response to TOR 2 and TOR 3 STECF concludes that for the next period three main activities 
need to be addressed: 
(i) Unification of concepts, definitions and variables 
(ii) Development of National Profiles 
(iii) Development of Community Profiles 
 
STECF concludes that the report provides a detailed description and methodology to enable the 
construction of both National and Community profiles. To further this development, STECF 
concludes that there is a necessity to produce clear and unified definitions of concepts, definitions 
and variables used. This unification should be achieved across all bodies currently involved in the 
development of social indicators such as STECF, PGECON and ICES WGSOCIAL. In order to do so 
it is proposed to convene a meeting of the Social variables sub-group of PGECON in early 2021. 
The meeting should be held as early as possible so as to provide clear guidance to MS before they 
begin their 2021 social data collection. Meeting attendees should include representatives of 
PGECON, STECF and ICES WGSOCIAL and should involve social scientists as well as data 
collectors and/or end users. The group should be tasked with defining concepts and variables 
following the recommendations of STECF EWG 19-03, 20-14 and relevant PGECON meetings.  
 
STECF concludes that to be able to properly analyse and advise on impacts of fisheries 
management measures these National and Community profiles are a necessity. As proven by 
EWG 20-14, describing and analysing the effects of, for example, the impact of an allocation 
system of fishing opportunities, between the SSCF and LSF requires this information. 
Nevertheless, in parallel with the analysis of the AER, the analysis of social indicators will always 
require national expertise for a proper contextual analysis.  
 
As for the development of National Profiles, it is anticipated that the National Profiles should be 
ready to be used in the next round of social data analysis in 2022. EWG 20-14 has already 
provided the outline of such National Profiles. To facilitate this process the following steps are 
suggested: 
(i) Several experts will be tasked with preparing example national profiles for selected 
countries. An ad hoc contract may be useful in ensuring that this task is done in a 
coherent and timely manner.  
(ii) In 2021 a dedicated EWG of STECF should be convened. This EWG should: 
a. Assess whether the example National profiles result in usable data and 
information. If required, the EWG may suggest necessary changes to the National 
Profile format. 
b. Assess possible discrepancies and comparability of the National Profiles 
across MS. 
c. Assess the extent to which the data produced are fit for purpose of analysing 
social impacts of fisheries management measures. 
d. Advise on further actions to be taken. Such as on the role of required 
experts in populating the National Profiles and analysing the outcome. 
e. By using the example National Profiles, further develop indicators for 
Reliance and Resilience, as suggested by EWG 19-03. 
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(iii) Based on the outcome of the EWG the final format for the National Profiles will be 
established and should be used as far as possible by the MS already in the upcoming Data 
Collection process. 
 
As for the development of the Community Profiles, this development will follow the process of 
establishing and populating the National Profiles in 2022. Based on the experiences during 2021 
and 2022 of working with the National Profiles the methodology as suggested by EWG 20-14 will 
be further developed.  
 
The Community Profiles can be perceived as further detailing the analysis for each sea basin 
indicating the common strengths and weaknesses of the sea basin regarding the objectives of the 
CFP which are currently developed under the EMFF. It is suggested for the 2022-2023 period to 
test the implementation of Community Profiles, in line with EWG 20-14 recommendations, in 
several pilots possibly in partnership with Fisheries Local Action Groups (FLAGs). 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This report on the social dimension of the CFP is the first report specifically addressing social 
aspects of the CFP. It gives in the first part (TOR 1-3) an overview on specific regulations 
regarding access to coastal waters under Art. 5.2 of the basic regulation (Regulation EU 
1380/2013), whether member states use social criteria for the distribution of fishing opportunities 
(Art. 16 and 17 of the basic regulation), and describe impacts of the different distribution systems 
of the fishing opportunities.  
In a second part we address improvements in the data collection on social variables for the 
fishing fleet (TOR 4) and elaborate how national and community profiles could look like (TOR 5). 
This publication includes a short introduction to the chapters on TOR 1-3 and a chapter for each 
of the five TOR.  
The report has been produced by experts from DG JRC and a group of experts convened under 
the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF). The group consisted of 
20 independent experts. The list of experts can be found in section 8. 
 
 
 
1.1 Terms of Reference for EWG-20-14 
 
Background and general objectives  
The current legal framework of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) refers to labour conditions, 
health and safety, as well as to job creation and training, social inclusion and a fair standard of 
living, putting a particular emphasis on coastal fishers and socio-economic aspects. Fisheries 
throughout Europe have undergone major structural changes, leading to important social 
consequences for both individual fishers as for fishing communities. In a number of fishing 
communities and regions of the EU, the social importance of the fisheries sector outweighs its 
direct economic contribution. 
There is an increasing awareness that more attention should be paid to the social dimension of 
fisheries. After a first social data collection in 2019, EWG 19-03 produced a report on social data 
in the fisheries sector, published in September 2019. Furthermore, when referring to the 2022 
reporting on the functioning of the CFP, the mission letter of Commissioner Sinkevičius explicitly 
mentions the need to address the social dimension.  
Against this background, the main objectives of this WG are: 
 To assess the impact of the Common Fisheries Policy Regulation and in particular the 
implementation of its Articles 5.2 (access to waters) and 16 and 17 (fishing 
opportunities) on the social situation of small-scale coastal fishers and their 
communities.  
 To build upon the findings of EWG 19-03 and further develop the methodologies for the 
collection and analysis of social data in fisheries, to be applied for the collection of social 
data for the data call 2021 and the subsequent analysis and use of these data.  
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STECF is requested to: 
 Assess the contribution of restrictions put in place by Member States under Article 5.2 
of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 to the preservation of coastal fleets’ traditional fishing 
activities to maintain the social and economic infrastructure of these areas1.  
 Assess for each Member State whether and, if so, how social criteria and criteria based 
upon the contribution to the local economy have been used by Member States when 
allocating the fishing opportunities available to them (Article 17 CFP).  
 Assess the impact of each of the national quota allocation systems on the social 
sustainability of the national fishing sector and in particular of small-scale coastal 
fishers and their communities. One specific aspect of the assessment should be the 
distribution of fishing rights between Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF) and Large-Scale 
Fisheries (LSF) in the Member States and whether rights move from small- to large-
scale vessels.  
 Provide recommendations, building upon those of EWG 19-03, on the social data 
gathering as part of the 2021 data call and propose a methodology tool for the analysis 
of social data obtained from the DCF combined with data from other sources such as 
ESTAT. This tool should allow the development of a time-series and trends and the use 
of social data in assessing the social impact of envisaged fisheries measures. 
Improvements in how data on specific variables e.g. unpaid labour by gender, could be 
collected, further stratified or disaggregated and analysed should be assessed. 
Particular attention needs to be paid to the coherence and consistency with the data 
gathered for, and the assessment provided in the Annual Economic Report and previous 
work carried out by PGECON on e.g. unpaid labour. This element should also be 
informed by work done in ICES Working Group on social indicators in fisheries.  
 STECF plenary 19-02 in reviewing EWG 19-03 concluded that in order to be able to 
properly analyse and interpret social data collected the data should be put in context 
through the provision of national and/or local fisheries sector profiles. The EWG should 
propose methodologies for the expansion of the social analysis to include a) national 
profiles which may include information on fisheries and quota management regimes, 
employment status of fishers, summaries of existing community profiles etc. and b) 
specific fishing community social profiles where possible. 
 
                                                 
1 The 2011 Commission report (COM(2011)418) on the former CFP Regulation states that the original 
objectives of these restrictions were: a) conservation of fish resources through allowing only small-scale 
coastal fleets into the area and b) preservation of coastal fleets' traditional fishing activities to maintain the 
social and economic infrastructure of these areas. 
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2 INTRODUCTION RESPONSE TOR 1-3 
In 2022 DG Mare will have to publish a report on the functioning of the CFP which includes the 
assessment of the social aspects of the basic regulation. Commissioner Sinkevičius demanded for 
the coming years a closer look at the social dimension of fisheries (reference). The Common 
Fisheries policy includes some provisions especially in Articles 5, 16 and 17 where MS can apply 
specific measures to address social aspects regarding access to waters (Art. 5) or distribution of 
fishing opportunities (Art. 16, 17). 
DG MARE requested STECF to analyse with the TOR 1-3 of this EWG how far those measures are 
implemented and what are possible impacts of the distribution of access rights to fishing 
opportunities. The EWG shall specifically address small-scale fisheries while Art. 5, 16 & 17 are 
not addressing explicitly small-scale fisheries (e.g. Art. 5 addresses “fishing vessels that 
traditionally fish in those waters from ports on the adjacent coast”). Limiting access to coastal 
waters, for example, is in several cases restricted to vessels of a certain small size or vessels 
using only static fishing gears, but in many other cases agreements between MS to access waters 
under jurisdiction of other MS involves fleets and gears different from small-scale coastal fleets 
because the use of towed gears or the size of the vessels involved.  
The importance of small-scale fisheries in Europe, as in other parts of the world, are often 
underestimated. However, as the FAO estimated 90% of the employment in capture fisheries is in 
the small-scale sector (FAO 2016). In Europe the situation may be a bit different and the 
percentage a bit lower. Nevertheless, small-scale fisheries have still great importance regarding 
employment, value added in coastal communities (including fish processing) or indirect positive 
effects on e.g. the tourist sector. Nearly everybody who visits, for example, the German North 
Sea coast buys a snack with brown shrimps or at least enjoys the view of small shrimp trawlers in 
the harbours. Brown shrimp is a regionally specific product, but many landings of small-scale 
fishers have to compete with landings of larger vessels (not in all regions direct marketing to 
restaurants or the local populations is possible). In the Canary Islands, a touristic destination 
characterized by sand, sun and sea, with a majority of small-scale fleet, a large percentage of the 
incoming tourist (70%) associate the destiny to the consumption of seafood as the main 
gastronomic attractive (Gaztelumendi 2017). The importance of additional employment in 
secondary sectors related to fisheries (e.g. restaurants or wholesalers) and specifically to small-
scale fisheries in the EU constitute an interesting area of research that has not been developed 
enough. This would facilitate a wider picture of the relevance of SSCF in the EU context. 
In case small vessel owners have to sell their fish on larger markets they often face low prices as 
larger vessels can usually catch fish with lower costs (are ‘more efficient’ on the basis of costs per 
kg of fish not in all other aspects like CO2 emissions per kg of fish). It seems that this was also 
often an important argument to favour larger vessels over smaller ones as ‘reasonable’ prices for 
fish were one of the objectives of the CFP. Not less relevant has been the large amount of 
subsidies received by large-scale fleets in comparison with small scale (3.5 to 1 globally, much 
higher proportion in Europe (Schuhbauer et al. 2020) Besides that, support for marketing of 
small-scale coastal flees have been slim in many areas of Europe, where most of the Producer 
Organisations have been traditionally linked to large-scale fisheries (Pascual et al. 2020a). 
Similarly, efforts for the differentiation of the small-scale local catches from imports or catches 
coming from large scale fleets have been slim. 
Although the small-scale sector is important, also the implemented management measures are 
and were in favour of the larger vessels. Owners of large vessels have easier access to capital to 
buy additional access rights (a reason for decreasing quota in the small scale sector in Germany), 
can catch fish mostly with lower costs and have easier access in the decision-making process. The 
available funding via the European Maritime and Fisheries Funds (EMFF) or its predecessors also 
favoured the larger vessels as local or regional authorities preferred to finance a large project 
with a larger vessel instead of many projects from small vessel owners. For the authorities it is 
also easier to deal with a small number of large vessels concentrated in a few large harbours 
compared to many small harbours with a large number of small-scale vessels. Efforts arranged 
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around axis 4 or priority 4 of the EMFF have not been always directed towards small-scale coastal 
fleets or fishing dependent populations, being focused on coastal communities development with 
a role of tourism development in the investment of funds probably larger than expected initially 
(Miret et al. 2020). 
The EWG is addressing TOR 1-3 in the following chapters but it is important to keep in mind that 
it is important to look at the whole picture of regulatory measures, market access issues or 
availability of funding when analysing the current situation of small-scale fisheries and to make 
recommendations how the small-scale sector may be able to ‘survive’ in the coming years. In this 
sense, it is rather difficult to isolate the effects of ART 5, 16 and 17, on the SSCF, as there are 
many other circumstances that affect the viability of these fleet segments. Labour regulations, 
security at sea regulations, formal requirements to become a member of a crew and market 
regulations or policies, to name only a few, may have a decisive impact on the viability of small-
scale fishing communities. 
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3 IMPLEMENTATION OF ART. 5.2 OF THE BASIC REGULATION OF THE CFP (TOR 1) 
 
3.1 Historical origins of the reserved access in the region of 6-12 miles 
The European Economic Community was founded in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, that included 
only six countries Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. At 
this earliest stage fisheries were not a priority, agricultural development took most of the 
attention. The first regulations about fisheries appear in 1970, focused on structural aids to the 
sector (Regulation 2141/70), and the markets of fishery products (Regulation 2142/70). The 
philosophy in the background of these regulations placed the emphasis “in the increase of 
production and the financial support to the modernisation and development of the means of 
production” (Penas Lado 2016:43). In this philosophy, it was assumed that an investment in 
means of production and an increase of the capacity of the fleet would provide a rise of the 
catches and improve the economic situation of the fishers. In some sense, it was expected that 
fishing activity would behave similarly to agriculture, where the green revolution in the 1950s-
1960s had increased crop yields substantially (Penas Lado 2016). New technologies, high-yield 
cereal varieties, chemical fertilizers, new cultivation methods and increasing mechanization and 
industrialization had radically transformed agriculture in two decades. However, it was not so 
easy to transfer this experience into fisheries. In this sector, no investment can be made in 
improving the resource, in transforming the ecosystem to favour the growth of a species of 
fishing interest, except when aquaculture techniques are developed. In fishing, human uses are 
always at the mercy of the natural productivity of ecosystems, and when resources are 
intensively extracted, weakening an aspect of that ecosystem, the continuity of the same fishing 
activity may be jeopardised. In any case, policies that promoted the industrialisation of the 
fisheries, including a diversity of subsidies to increasing the capacity of the fleet, would continue 
to be relevant in Europe for years. 
The regulations 2141/70 and 2142/70, appeared in a milieu where the control of marine 
resources were increasingly under the scrutiny of the states, and the extension of territorial sea 
and Exclusive Economic Zone would be under discussion for decades, with some countries 
pushing for extending the limits and others for maintaining the status quo. The European 
Fisheries Convention of 1964 facilitated the extension of the control to 12 miles from baselines. 
That was increasingly relevant in a context where 90% of the catches of the initial members were 
developed far from their territorial waters (Penas Lado 2016). Furthermore, a key principle was 
established at this moment, the freedom of access to other member’s states waters, and the role 
of the council of ministers for adoption of any regulation or conservation measure (Penas Lado 
2016). This was expected to be accepted by any new member of the Union, as the enlargement 
of the union in 1973 with the entrance of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark would 
demonstrate. In some sense the rule of free access to waters was considered a political deal 
between those countries possessing the waters and those having the large markets (Penas Lado 
2016). However, in those treaties of accession a reserved access to the 6-12 miles zone was 
established to “… vessels which fish traditionally in those waters and which operate from ports in 
that geographical coastal area...” until 1982 (Art 100, 101). It was also detailed in these articles 
that other Member States traditionally fishing in those areas have still access to those waters.  
This agreement was later consolidated in future basic regulations of the CFP, that have extended 
its validity, in practice, to the present day. This way, the next big reform of European fishing 
policies in 1983 (Regulation 170/1983) consolidated the access regime within the 12 nautical 
miles of the territorial sea, with preferent access to the first six miles for nationals, while the area 
between 6-12 miles from baselines should involve the continuation of traditional access of other 
fleets on existing practices. Some excerpts from this regulation may illustrate the continuation of 
the policies regarding spatial access up to 12 miles.  
 “Whereas there should be special provisions for inshore fishing to enable this sector to 
cope with the new fishing conditions resulting from the institution of 200-mile fishing 
zones; whereas, to this end, Member States should be authorized to maintain in an 
initial stage until 31 December 1992 the derogation…” (recital, 170/1983) 
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“As from 1 January 1983 and until 31 December 1992, Member States shall be 
authorized to retain the arrangements defined in Article l00 of the 1972 Act of Accession and to 
generalize up to 12 nautical miles for all waters under their sovereignty or jurisdiction 
the limit of six miles laid down in that Article” (Regulation 170/1983 Article 6.1) 
(emphasis added). 
In this regulation a number of derogations related to the access of Member States to the water of 
other Member States were detailed (Annex1), like happened later in all the future reforms of the 
basic regulations of the Common Fisheries Policy. 
Penas Lado explains the reasoning behind these regulations very clearly: “This principle is in fact 
a derogation to the principle of equal access and initially it applied for 10 years but has worked so 
well that it has been remarkably stable and has been reincorporated into the CFP after every 
reform.” (Penas Lado 2016, 54). This was maintained in the reform of 1992 (EEC No 3760/ 92) 
that basically extended the regime applicable to the 12 miles territorial sea from baselines until 
2002. The basic regulation of the Common Fisheries Policy of 2002 (EC No 2371/2002 of 20 
December 2002) once more extended the status quo of these waters, it is useful to check the 
exact text of the relevant recitals and articles: 
Recital 11: In their 12 nautical mile zone, Member States should be allowed to adopt 
conservation and management measures applicable to all fishing vessels, provided that, where 
such measures apply to fishing vessels from other Member States, the measures adopted are 
non-discriminatory and prior consultation has taken place, and that the Community has not 
adopted measures specifically addressing conservation and management within this area. 
Recital 14. Rules in place restricting access to resources within the 12 nautical mile zones of 
Member States have operated satisfactorily benefiting conservation by restricting fishing effort 
in the most sensitive part of Community waters and preserving traditional fishing 
activities on which the social and economic development of certain coastal 
communities is highly dependent. They should therefore continue to apply until 31 
December 2012. 
Art. 17.2. In the waters up to 12 nautical miles from baselines under their sovereignty or 
jurisdiction, Member States shall be authorised from1 January 2003 to 31 December 2012 to 
restrict fishing to fishing vessels that traditionally fish in those waters from ports on 
the adjacent coast, without prejudice to the arrangements for Community fishing vessels 
flying the flag of other Member States under existing neighbourhood relations between 
Member States and the arrangements contained in Annex I, fixing for each Member State the 
geographical zones within the coastal bands of other Member States where fishing activities 
are pursued and the species concerned. (emphasis added) 
As in the previous regulations that supported this criteria, these arrangements were expected to 
be analysed in a report to be presented by the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council by 31 December 2011, in order to decide about the future regulations on this respect, 
that once more confirmed its validity. 
In any case, it is relevant to note some special cases about these areas under control by Member 
States. For instance, in the Mediterranean some countries like Greece have maintained 6 miles of 
territorial sea, where these regulations are applicable. In the opposite side, the Regulation 
1954/2003 (Western Waters Regulation), created a specific access regime for the Canary Islands, 
Azores and Madeira, granting access to the first 100 miles of the EEZ to the local fleets with 
similar criteria to the above mentioned regulations, including the respect to historical rights of 
fleets from other member states and bilateral agreements between them. 
It is relevant to highlight the statements about the regulations about access to these 12 miles 
zone in the report COM(2011) 4182, intended to evaluate the adequacy of these regulations. This 
report introduced some reasoning that was not present previously in the regulations 2371/2002: 
                                                 
2 COM(2011) 418 On Reporting Obligations under Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 
2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries 
Policy. 
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 “The objectives related to introduction (before entry into force of the CFP) of specific 
arrangements in the waters up to 12 nautical miles as formulated in Article 17(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 were: 
 conservation of fish resources through allowing only small-scale coastal fleets 
into the area. These fleets generally exert less fishing pressure in areas which may include 
the most sensitive EU waters, and include spawning areas, and 
 preservation of coastal fleets' traditional fishing activities to maintain the social and 
economic infrastructure of these areas. 
These specific restriction provisions were introduced in the CFP in 1983 and have been extended 
with every reform of the policy since.” (page 4) (emphasis added) 
Effectively, in the original regulation text (EC No 2371/2002, transcribed above) there were no 
clear references to “allowing only small-scale coastal fleets into the area”, as suggested in this 
report, so the description of the objectives of the previous regulation perhaps was misinterpreted 
in COM(2011) 418. 
In any case, the conclusions about the adequacy of this regime of access look clear and confirms 
again the pertinence of maintaining the status-quo designed since the seventies. 
“Since 2002, the Commission was not informed of (real) problems or conflicts on specific 
restrictions, whether on setting them or on their management and functioning. Member States 
were able to resolve problems without having to refer any of them to the Commission. The 
regime is very stable, and the rules have continued to operate satisfactorily. All Member States 
stressed the importance of the specific restrictions in the light of their original objectives in 
their reactions to the Green Paper on CFP reform. One Member State suggested extending the 
6-12 miles regime to 10-20 miles to achieve the regime’s objectives more effectively.” (p. 5) 
As this report summarized, “… the objectives for the specific regime appear to remain as valid 
as they were in 2002. Modifying current arrangements might disrupt the current balance that 
has developed since the introduction of the special regime.” (p.5) 
This perception about the adequacy of these regulations persisted in the negotiation process for 
the CFP, that finished in 2013 with REGULATION (EU) No 1380/2013, as Penas Lado suggests: 
“The support to the existing regime applicable to the 12 nautical miles was almost unanimous” 
(442). This way the text in the new regulation about the 12 miles derogation does not differ 
clearly from the previous regulations. In the recitals of 2013 CFP, its success is emphasised, 
including the assertion that these rules have contributed to preserve the traditional fishing 
activities in coastal areas: 
REGULATION (EU) No 1380/2013 CFP. Recital 19: “Existing rules restricting access to 
resources within the 12 nautical mile zones of Member States have operated satisfactorily, 
benefiting conservation by restricting fishing effort in the most sensitive part of Union waters. 
Those rules have also preserved the traditional fishing activities on which the social and 
economic development of certain coastal communities is highly dependent. Those rules should 
therefore continue to apply. Member States should endeavour to give preferential access for 
small-scale, artisanal or coastal fishermen” (emphasis added) 
However, in our opinion the report COM(2011) 418 does not provide clear arguments to support 
the assertion that it has preserved the traditional fishing activities. In fact, if we have an historical 
perspective of the balance of the SSCF and LSF in Europe it is possible to find that the most 
traditional fisheries have been displaced in favour of not so traditional productive schemes, 
shifting the balance between both sectors. In any case, what is clear in this process is that these 
regulations have not created conflicts that make MS thinking twice about supporting it. This way, 
the articles 5.2 and 5.3 reproduces the wording of previous legal texts very similarly. 
Art. 5.2. “In the waters up to 12 nautical miles from baselines under their sovereignty or 
jurisdiction, Member States shall be authorised, until 31 December 2022, to restrict fishing 
to fishing vessels that traditionally fish in those waters from ports on the adjacent 
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coast, without prejudice to the arrangements for Union fishing vessels flying the flag of other 
Member States under existing neighbourhood relations between Member States and the 
arrangements contained in Annex I, fixing for each Member State the geographical zones 
within the coastal bands of other Member States where fishing activities are pursued and the 
species concerned. Member States shall inform the Commission of the restrictions put in place 
under this paragraph” 
Art. 5.3. “In the waters up to 100 nautical miles from the baselines of the Union 
outermost regions referred to in the first paragraph of Article 349 of the Treaty, the Member 
States concerned shall be authorised, until 31 December 2022, to restrict fishing to vessels 
registered in the ports of those territories. Such restrictions shall not apply to Union vessels 
that traditionally fish in those waters, in so far as those vessels do not exceed the fishing effort 
traditionally exerted. Member States shall inform the Commission of the restrictions put in 
place under this paragraph” (emphasis added) 
It is relevant to note the wording of the successive regulation on this subject as they authorise 
Member States to establish restrictions in the 12 miles zone in favour of fishing vessels that 
traditionally fish in those waters from ports on the adjacent coast. This is not compulsory in the 
regulation, and it is not implemented in general in most member states, of course not in the 
wording of the COM(2011) 418 (see also Pascual-Fernández et al. 2020). It is possible to find a 
diversity of examples where regulation compatible with these articles are effectively 
implemented, to favour local fleets, as we are going to exemplify in the third section of the text 
for TOR1. It is clear that these regulations have had an important role to help in recognizing the 
rights of fleets of different MS to enter the waters up to 12 miles under non-discriminatory 
treatment. That will be the subject of the next section of this TOR. In short, it looks that the 
derogation to free access to waters of neighbour countries under ART. 5(2) and 5(3) REG. 
1380/2013, do not create major conflicts and because of that has gained support for so long in 
the EU law.  
 
3.2 Analysis of the existing neighbourhood relations between Member States  
A number of agreements between MS are already included in each new version of the CFP. The 
agreements could depend, at national level, on geographical areas, historical closest countries, 
number of vessels and/or species.  
Member States always have derogations in progress written in the Annex 1 of the CFP. In 2020, 
Member States provided information to DG MARE on measures taken to restrict access to their 
waters in accordance with Article 5.2. and 5.3. Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, France, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia apply a derogation for the 12 miles 
access to their resources. In this document, the agreement pending between Italy and Greece 
concerned the redefinition of ZEE and do not fill with the article 5(2) of the CFP. Moreover, France 
specified to have prohibited vessels using electric pulse within 12 miles in zone F, part of CIEM IV 
c. However, this decision is not under ART. 5(2) REG. 1380/2013. 
In 2020, two countries, Estonia and Cyprus claim for full prohibition in its national waters and 
only vessels listed on national register could enter into this 6-12 miles limit. 
Derogations depend on multi-actors: species, areas, coastal distance, species in areas, species in 
areas and distance. And for some, not mentioned in the Annex 1 of the CFP, bilateral agreements 
could refer also to the number of vessels, or metiers. A good example is the bilateral agreement 
for Spain and Portugal, signed in 2018 (Decree 25/2018, Acuerdo sobre condiciones de ejercicio 
de la actividad de las flotas española y portuguesa en las aguas de ambos países entre el Reino 
de Espana y la Republica Portuguesa). 2 areas are concerned by this agreement: Rio Mino and 
Rio Guadiana. Derogations are about number of vessels depending on the métiers.  
 
Table 3.1 Countries which have access to water under jurisdiction of other MS 
 
25 
 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes bilateral agreements under ART. 5(2) REG. 1380/2013, 15 Member States 
applied the derogations to the access to waters regime as foreseen in Article 5. As shown, 4 
countries, mainly explained by their geographical situation and their history in European Union, 
have 5 bilateral agreements each: France, Netherlands, Ireland and United Kingdom.  
 
Table 3.2 Countries which have access to water under jurisdiction of other MS Derogations by 
species 
 
 
If for some countries as Sweden, Member States signed bilateral agreement for “all species”, (see 
Table 3.2) other ones detailed species on specific areas which are under the regulation. Denmark 
has bilateral agreement with Germany which is able to target flatfish, shrimps and prawns, sprat, 
cod, saithe, haddock, mackerel, herring, whiting, nephrops, eel, salmon but not in the same 
areas. 
 
Table 3.3 Countries which have access to water under jurisdiction of other MS Derogations by 
areas 
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The geographical distribution of the different bilateral agreements shows that the agreements 
under Annex 1 of the CFP do not only concern SSFs (see Table 3.3). French Small-Scale Fisheries 
vessels do not go to fish in these zones 4a, 6a, 7a. 
 
Table 3.4 Countries which have access to water under jurisdiction of other MS Derogations by 
coastal distance 
 
 
More often, the derogations allow foreign vessels to navigate in territorial waters between 6 and 
12 miles (Table 3.4). Some countries could give access to closest waters as Denmark, where 
depending on the species or the area, these closest limitations could change from 3, 4 or 6 miles.  
In order to preserve the activities of the SSF, these tables summarizing these derogations can 
give a preview of the impact of possible changes in the strategy of Member States or European 
Union on fishing effort, geographical occupation, species impacted. However, it is only a ‘fixed 
picture’ which does not demonstrate social impacts on European fleet but could be an indicator. 
 
Brexit issues 
United Kingdom is one of the Member States which have the more important number of bilateral 
agreements all around its territory (with 5 different Member States). The EWG 2014 underlines 
the difficulties to conclude how far Brexit will impact the derogations to free access to UK waters.  
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One of Brexit's major problems is that we do not know which agreements will continue, which 
ones will stop. According to the 4 tables presented, we can see that the French, Irish, Belgian, 
German and Dutch fleets will be directly impacted, but we do not yet know to what extent: total 
cessation of fishing in British waters, which fisheries would be maintained? 
On the other hand, will the UK fleets still fish in the 6-12 miles waters limit of EU MS? 
Negotiations are still in progress. Any measures could impact Member States which have signed 
bilateral agreement with United Kingdom (fishing effort, evolution of number of vessels, social 
dimensions, economic issues, etc.) but also other Member States as the equilibrium built during 
years between countries will not be the same.  
 
Outermost Regions 
A special case are the Outermost regions, that enjoy reserved access a 100 miles zone, also with 
agreements that cover other MS fleets with historical rights in this area 
 In the waters up to 100 nautical miles from the coasts of Europe’s outermost regions 
MS concerned are authorised to restrict access to vessels registered in those territories 
and to vessels that traditionally fish in those waters. This exception expired by end 
2022 (See Art. 5.3. REGULATION (EU) No 1380/2013 CFP) 
Marine biological resources around the Union outermost regions referred to in the first paragraph 
of Article 349 of the Treaty should be especially protected since they contribute to the 
preservation of the local economy of those territories, having regard to their structural, social and 
economic situation. Certain fishing activities in those waters should therefore be limited to fishing 
vessels registered in the ports of those territories. 
Practically, Canary Islands and Madeira are following this rule. Azores claimed to access 200 NM 
due to sea mounts resources within and outside these 200 NM but the case was brought to court 
and not approved. 
In the waters up to 100 nautical miles from the baselines of Guadeloupe, French Guiana, 
Martinique, Réunion and Mayotte, fishing shall be limited to vessels registered in the ports of 
those overseas territories unless derogation is granted by the State. Such limitations shall not 
apply to vessels registered in the European Union fishing traditionally in those waters, provided 
that those vessels do not exceed the fishing effort traditionally carried out there. In Mayotte 
waters, trawlers are not allowed, like the Canary Islands.  
Due to their insularity Outermost territories are subject to specific resource sharing conditions 
(except French Guiana which is an inland territory). The example of the Ilhas Selvagens that has 
been claimed between Portugal and Spain can illustrate this situation. 
 
 
3.3 Case Studies for access restrictions for small scale fishing vessels in coastal 
waters 
 
Germany 
In German territorial waters vessels from Denmark and The Netherlands are allowed to fish. Main 
target species are brown shrimp in the North Sea, Cod in the Baltic Sea. For the access to the 
coastal waters some restrictions are in place introduced by an EU regulation (‘Plaice Box’ North 
Sea) or regulations from the regional states (Baltic Sea). This limits the access to the 12 nm zone 
(North Sea) or 3 nm zone (Baltic Sea in Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania) to small-scale 
vessels.  
Plaice-Box North Sea (Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands) 
With EU Council Resolution 4193/88 the EU established the so-called Plaice Box (PB) which limits 
the access to the coastal waters in the Wadden Sea to vessels with not more than 221 kw (Beare 
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et al. 2013). The PB is covering 42,000 km2 of which 24,000 km2 are located within the 12 nm 
zone. The reason for the limitation of access was limiting the bycatch of small plaice as a 
conservation measure for the plaice stock. In 2010 the EC issued a study to evaluate the PB 
(Beare et al. 2010). A clear link between the closure of the area for larger vessels and the 
success of the PB is not easy to draw. The fishing effort in the area changed substantially (see 
Table 3.5). 
 
Table 3.5: Development of Fishing effort in the PB (Baere et al. 2013, p. 53) 
 
The effort of larger vessels decreased to a small proportion while the effort of small shrimp fishing 
vessels increased substantially. The shrimp fishery is not regulated by quota or other access 
limitations (in Germany vessels need a licence and only trained fishers can get a license) and the 
shrimp landings have increased over time. This could be due to the lower levels of some of the 
predator stocks as cod in the area. The smaller beam trawlers switched from a mixed fishery for 
shrimps and flatfish to a pure shrimp fishery. Since the introduction of the PB the shrimp fishing 
sector was in most of the years the most profitable part of the small-scale fisheries (Döring et al. 
2020). It is not possible, however, to link that directly to the PB but the regulation is still in place 
today although the plaice stock is at its highest level on record (ICES). 
German Baltic Sea Small-scale fisheries 
For the Baltic Sea Small-scale fisheries a few specific rules regarding access to the 3 nm zone 
were introduced by the two regional states (Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania (MV) and 
Schleswig-Holstein (SH)). The regional states are responsible for fisheries management measures 
within the German 12 nm zone including licences, area closures or prohibited fishing gears (e.g. 
‘regulation of coastal fisheries’ MV, see Döring et al. 2020, p. XX). The regulation in MV includes 
the ban of towed gears in the 3 nm zone which includes large areas of the so-called ‚Bodden‘, 
shallow areas surrounded at least partially by land (internal waters). Danish fishers have partially 
access to German waters, but this is more important in the North Sea (e.g. shrimp and gillnet 
fishers in the Wadden Sea). 
The small-scale fishing sector is economically in a very critical situation as both main target 
species, Western Baltic Herring and Western Baltic Cod, are in bad shape and quotas very low. 
Slight increases of catches of other species (like freshwater species) could substitute the losses of 
herring and cod. Therefore, the limitation of coastal waters to the small-scale fleet was not 
sufficient to lead to a viable small-scale fishing sector. 
 
Spain and the Canary Islands 
Fisheries in the waters under jurisdiction of Spain are diverse, as several seas and very different 
coastal and human landscapes are involved. Fisheries in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the 
Cantabric Sea or in outermost regions like the Canary Islands show relevant differences. As a 
consequence, regulations in Spain take into account these specificities since long ago, with 
general regulations and then specific ones for large areas of the sea under the control of Spain: 
Cantabric Sea and Northwest; Gulf of Cadiz, Mediterranean Sea and finally the Canary Islands. 
Besides that, the political framework in Spain after the dictatorship of Franco involved a 
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decentralised State with regional governments that held the control of inland and interior waters 
while the State maintained the control of territorial sea and EEZ (Pascual et al. 2020b). The 
interior waters are excluded from the Art. 5.2 of the CFP, that refers to the waters from 
baselines, but in any case the control of regional governments of these areas may influence the 
national regulations in the waters under its jurisdiction and vice versa, as it is expected some 
compatibility and coordination between national and regional regulations in each area. That is 
even more evident in outermost regions like the Canary Islands, where Spain is authorised to 
restrict access to the vessels registered in those territories (art 5.3 CFP). In this area general 
restrictions to industrial gears have been implemented since long ago: trawling is prohibited like 
the purse seiners for tuna. Most of the fleet is small-scale, and the regulations pay special 
attention to the specificities of each Island. This way, the fishing gears allowed in an Island like El 
Hierro are very different and more restrictive than those permitted in Gran Canaria or Tenerife. 
Each of these islands may have conditions very different to other islands, in relation to resource 
abundance, continental shelf or fishing pressure. 
It is relevant to note the role of the regional government and the fisher organizations in the 
development of fisheries regulations in the Canary Islands. For instance, cofradías -fisher 
organizations with historical tradition in Spain (Bavinck et al. 2015), in some islands arrange 
proposals to the administration in order to modify the gears allowed on their island. Many of the 
regulations adopted by the administration since the 1980s have been inspired by the demands of 
the fisher's associations. For example, the decree (90/1997 of 9 June) which prohibits the 
practice of longline fishing on the islands of Fuerteventura and El Hierro, makes explicit reference 
to the will of the fishermen's associations on both islands to justify the application of such a 
measure. In this sense, we could say that some of these fishermen's organisations have learned 
to obtain from the national and regional administration legislative measures which they consider 
most beneficial to the ecosystem on which they depend, while preserving their traditional fishing 
methods. The different regulations regarding the use of pots in Fuerteventura have also revolved 
around the proposals made by the Island's fishermen's associations, like the restriction to pots for 
fish or longlines in El Hierro. This facilitates the activities of the small-scale fleets in the 
Archipelago. 
 
Conclusions 
The EWG concludes that no MS reported any conflicts regarding Art. 5.2 and the special rule to 
allow vessels traditionally fishing in the area in the territorial waters (6-12 nm). As this regulation 
is basically in place since the early 1970ies and was included in the first basic regulation of the 
CFP 1982 and every revision of the basic regulation ever since (1992, 2002, 2013) it is well 
accepted and avoided conflicts between MS.  
The EWG notes, however, that due to the termination of the CFP for the UK access rights to 
coastal waters are unclear after the 1st of January 2021 in areas where so far Art. 5.2 has given 
access for MS vessels within UK waters and in waters of EU MS for UK vessels. This may lead to 
conflicts between the UK and MS of the EU. 
The EWG concludes that Art. 5.2 regulates access to the territorial waters for vessels of 
neighbouring MS traditionally fishing in that area. There is no limitation to small-scale fishing 
vessels. Some MS, however, limit the access to coastal waters (mostly 0-6 nm, but in some cases 
there is EU regulation also for 6-12 nm (see Plaice Box in the North Sea)) to vessels of certain 
sizes or vessels using specific fishing gear.  
The EWG notes that it was not possible for the EWG to draw a conclusion that where the access 
to coastal waters is limited to vessels of the small-scale segments/coastal fisheries (e.g. Plaice 
Box North Sea) this lead to a positive development of coastal fleets or at least had positive effects 
on the segments.  
Furthermore, if we try to apply in the analysis the definition of small-scale coastal vessels derived 
from the EU regulations this is not comparable to the regulations of most of the MS, that use 
specific national regulations to differentiate smaller segments of the fleet from larger ones. As a 
consequence, the evaluation of the impacts of EU regulations on SSCF looks especially 
complicated, as the EU support a specific definition of SSCF and the MS a different one, being the 
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translation rather complex in most cases (Pascual et al. 2020, Pita et al. 2020). It is relevant to 
note that most of the management measures on SSCF are developed by MS. 
Furthermore, it is rather difficult to isolate the effects of ART 5.2 and even jointly with articles 16 
and 17, on the SSCF, as there are many other circumstances that affect the viability of these fleet 
segments. Labour regulations, security at sea regulations, formal requirements to become a 
member of a crew and market regulations or policies, to name only a few, may have a decisive 
impact on the viability of small-scale fishing communities. Here further analyses are necessary. 
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4 THE USE OF SOCIAL CRITERIA IN THE ALLOCATION OF FISHING OPPORTUNITIES (TOR 2) 
The second output from the terms of reference asks the EWG to assess for each Member State 
whether, and if so, how social criteria have been used by Member States to allocate the fishing 
opportunities available to them under Article 17 of the CFP. The following sections first review the 
historical context behind the inclusion of social criteria in the CFP and provide definitions used by 
the EWG in our assessment, before concluding with a summary table documenting the use of 
social criteria in Member State allocations and a discussion of their role. 
 
4.1 Background on the development of Article 17 and the inclusion of social 
criteria 
The development of Article 17 of the CFP and the inclusion of social criteria can be situated in the 
context of two parallel developments in the most recent CFP reform: a recognition of the 
importance of social objectives and a focus on the allocation of fishing opportunities as a key 
policy lever. 
In 2008, the European Commission’s Green Paper identified the unclear and conflicting objectives 
of the CFP as one of the policy’s key structural failings. The Green Paper noted that while the CFP 
aims to manage fisheries to provide sustainable economic, environmental, and social conditions, 
no priority between these objectives is specified and one condition may dominate others in 
practice. 
The Green Paper also highlighted overcapacity as a key structural failing in CFP management and 
suggested that “market instruments such as transferable rights…may be a more efficient and less 
expensive way to reduce overcapacity” as “operators adapt their fleet to their fishing rights in 
order to achieve economic efficiency.” After consultation on the Green Paper the Commission 
went further, proposing that as of 2014 all Member States would be obliged to use ‘transferable 
fishing concessions’ at a national level for all species under quota or effort limits. Although the 
proposal contained key conditions (SSCF excluded, relative stability respected, no property rights 
granted, time-limited allocations that revert back to the state, and the use of a reserve for new 
entrants), several Member States and many stakeholders opposed the proposal and it was 
eventually dropped. 
While the proposal for transferable fishing concessions failed, it focused attention on fishing 
opportunities as a means to deliver policy objectives. Environmental NGOs (with some 
exceptions, e.g. WWF and EDF), working in coalition with the newly-formed EU lobby group for 
small-scale fishers (the Low-impact Fishers of Europe), saw the use of fishing opportunities as a 
lever to achieve ends other than economic efficiency. Instead of mandatory transferability, this 
coalition pushed for the mandatory use of social and environmental criteria in the allocation of 
fishing opportunities. 
A shift to social criteria could precipitate profound changes in the distribution of fishing 
opportunities. A 2011 paper (Crilly & Esteban, 2011) analysed the UK demersal and gillnet 
fisheries for cod, finding that if all contributions to society (both negative and positive) were 
considered, gillnetters delivered a higher societal value per tonne of cod quota. The authors 
recommended that EU Member States should be “re-assessing their current methods of quota 
allocation, moving towards use of environmental and social criteria, as opposed to historical catch 
records, when allocating quota among its fleet” (pg. 30). Moreover, because the study found that 
trawlers were more profitable than gillnetters (without including externalities), a system of 
transferable fishing concessions would result in the exact opposite outcome with fishing 
opportunities concentrating overtime in the trawl fleet. In this example criteria-based allocations 
would be used to counteract economic efficiency (in financial terms), not support it. 
The efforts of environmental NGOs and small-scale fishers proved successful in the European 
Parliament. On 6 February 2013, the European Parliament held its first reading of the 
Commission's proposed draft of the new base regulation. The Parliament deleted the proposal for 
transferable fishing concessions (Article 29) and replaced it with “transparent and objective 
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environmental and social criteria” that would be determined at the Member State level. The text 
read:  
(28a) Access to the fishery should be based on transparent and objective 
environmental and social criteria, as a means of promoting responsible fishing 
which would serve to ensure that those operators who fish in the least 
environmentally damaging way and provide the greatest benefits for society are 
encouraged. 
(29a) In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, each Member State should 
be allowed to choose its method of allocating the fishing opportunities assigned 
to it without an allocation system being imposed at Union level. In this way, 
Member States will remain free to establish, or not to establish, a system of 
transferable fishing concessions. 
In the Parliament’s counterproposal there was no mention of “economic” criteria. It is unclear 
whether this was because they were considered to be covered by "social criteria" or intentionally 
excluded. Later, in what became the draft of Article 17, the wording (then Article 16a), treated 
"contribution to the local economy" as an example of a social criterion. The text read: 
16 (a) Criteria for Member States' allocation of fishing opportunities 
When allocating the fishing opportunities available to them as referred to in 
Article 16, Member States shall use transparent and objective environmental and 
social criteria, such as the impact of the fishery on the environment, the history 
of compliance and the contribution to the local economy. Other criteria such as 
historic catch levels may also be used. Within the fishing opportunities assigned 
to them, Member States shall provide incentives to fishing vessels deploying 
selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental 
impact such as reduced energy consumption or habitat damage. 
Transferable fishing concessions were not completely removed from the regulation, however, and 
several references remained. The entirety of Article 21 on the “management of fishing capacity” 
is simply a permission to develop transferable fishing concessions. Furthermore, and of direct 
relevance to Article 17, Article 16 (6) implies that in systems of transferable fishing concessions 
the question of allocation is of no relevance. The text of Article 16 (6) and 17, adopted in 
reformed CFP (Council Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013) reads: 
16 (6) Each Member State shall decide how the fishing opportunities that are 
allocated to it, and which are not subject to a system of transferable fishing 
concessions, may be allocated to vessels flying its flag (e.g. by creating 
individual fishing opportunities). It shall inform the Commission of the allocation 
method. 
17) When allocating the fishing opportunities available to them, as referred to in 
Article 16, Member States shall use transparent and objective criteria including 
those of an environmental, social and economic nature. The criteria to be used 
may include, inter alia, the impact of fishing on the environment, the history of 
compliance, the contribution to the local economy and historic catch levels. 
Within the fishing opportunities allocated to them, Member States shall 
endeavour to provide incentives to fishing vessels deploying selective fishing 
gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact, such as 
reduced energy consumption or habitat damage. 
In the final version of Article 17, economic criteria were specifically introduced, and placed on an 
equal footing with environmental and social criteria. Perhaps relatedly, historical catch levels were 
put on the same footing as the other exemplar criteria. The compulsion to provide incentive-
based allocations was also demoted to an obligation to "endeavour" to do so.  
Despite these amendments during the final legislative process, Article 17 could still have a 
potentially transformational impact on EU fisheries by leveraging one of the most important policy 
 
33 
levers in fishing opportunities. However, the actual allocations, and interpretation of the article, 
would lie with Member States. 
 
 
4.2 Definitions of fishing opportunities and social criteria 
Article 4 of the CFP provides definitions for terms used in the regulation, but ‘fishing opportunity’ 
is not included. The only definition of fishing opportunities that has been elaborated in EU 
legislation is Council Regulation (EC) No. 1224/2009 which defines a fishing opportunity as a 
“quantified legal entitlement to fish, expressed in terms of catches and/or fishing effort”. What 
remains unclear from this definition is the scope of fishing effort, for example where the line is 
drawn between fishing effort and technical regulations (e.g. a limit on days at sea, a limit on 
number of pots, or a limit on mesh size). Catch limits are more clearly fishing opportunities and 
are specifically defined in Article 4. Some authors have proposed that spatial access can also be 
considered a fishing opportunity and should therefore be allocated under the requirements of 
Article 17 (Williams & Carpenter, 2018). 
The definition of social criteria is even more problematic. No definition is provided in any EU 
fisheries regulations, nor is one provided in any of the literature on social criteria in EU fisheries 
(Grieve, 2009; Crilly & Esteban, 2011; Blomeyer et al., 2015; Carpenter & Kleinjans, 2017). In 
the corporate social responsibility literature, it is explained that "social criteria examine how [a 
business] manages relationships with employees, suppliers, customers, and the communities 
where it operates." In this case the scope of social criteria is clear (i.e. relationships with people), 
but this definition is oriented towards measurement compared to something actionable, as Article 
17 requires. 
The result is that the interpretation of social criteria is still open to debate. The EWG applied a 
broad working definition based on the intended impact of the criteria. While every criterion has a 
social impact (as fisheries management is about managing people), some criteria, such as those 
based on low-impact fishing gears are intended to ease pressure on the marine ecosystem and 
the social impact is an indirect, secondary impact.  
This working definition does not remove ambiguities, for example the unclear distinction between 
economic and social criteria (and as illustrated by the amendments to Article 17). Some criteria 
may appear to be economic because they are about financial transactions (e.g. contribution to 
the local economy, crew wages) but they also have a clear social impact. These impacts (and 
criteria) are sometimes termed ‘socio-economic’.  
The use of historical catches as an allocation criterion was determined by the EWG to be a social 
criterion under this working definition. This may not be the conventional understanding of 
historical catches but there were three important reasons for this classification. First, it was 
determined that the primary intended impact of historical catches is to minimise aggravation from 
the fishing industry by providing stability. Second, while a historical catches criterion may be seen 
as economic because it likely favours larger fishing operations with higher economic output, if the 
primary intended impact was to increase economic output (e.g. GDP or GVA) then allocations 
could be made on this basis through direct allocation to the most profitable fleet 
segments/vessels or through the auctioning of fishing opportunities. Third, while in practice the 
historical catch criterion has often worked against the use of social criteria, this does not in itself 
exclude historical catch from being defined as a social criterion, rather it indicates that social 
criteria can sometimes be at odds with one another. As the historical catch criterion is the most 
commonly used criterion used in the allocation of fishing opportunities, this definitional issue has 
great importance for the ToR. 
 
4.3 Acquiring information on the use of social criteria in the allocation of fishing 
opportunities by Member States 
Although Article 17 of the CFP requires transparent and objective criteria, the details of Member 
State allocation systems are often difficult to come by. Furthermore, while Article 16 (6) of the 
CFP (printed above) requires Member States to inform the European Commission of its allocation 
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method, two requests by the European Commission in 2016 and 2020 yielded responses from 
only a subset of Member States (16/23 in 2020, see table 4.1). While these responses were 
provided to the EWG, several responses were of limited use as they contained only broad 
descriptions of the national fishing fleet or simply emphasised the intent of their allocations.  
With only partial Member State coverage and partial information, the EWG supplemented the 
information with their knowledge of national systems, checking details in national laws, and 
gathering information from key sources in the secondary literature. This literature included MRAG 
et al, 2009; Carpenter & Kleinjans, 2017; and WWF, 2018 for cross-EU comparative studies, as 
well as several Member State-specific studies. The use of secondary literature also helped balance 
the Member State responses that were provided from a perspective of national compliance 
(rather than scientific analysis). 
The following table documents social criteria used by EU Member States in their allocation of 
fishing opportunities social criteria used in the allocation of fishing opportunities. The 
standardised definitions for allocation systems come from Oostdijk & Carpenter (2020). The table 
is not a comprehensive account, although it is the most detailed record compiled to date. The 
table only covers primary allocations and does not detail secondary systems such as how fishing 
families, businesses, and producer organisations decide to manage the fishing opportunities they 
are granted. General licensing conditions (e.g. having a valid licence) are not included. 
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Table 4.1: Social criteria used by EU Member States in their allocation of fishing opportunities 
Fisheries System overview Use of social criteria Other 
MS 
Managem
ent 
division 
Example species 
Fishing 
opportunit
y 
Duration Allocation 
What social criteria 
are used? 
How are the 
criteria 
operationalised? 
How are the 
criteria 
transparent and 
objective? 
Are the 
criteria 
incentive-
based? 
Other (non-
social) criteria 
B
e
lg
iu
m
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Sole, plaice, 
Norway lobster 
Catch 
quota 
Less than 
one year 
Individually 
rationed quota 
pool (large and 
small-scale), 
total quota pool 
(coastal) 
Vessel size, flexible 
system based on 
collective and full 
utilisation of quotas. 
Large-scale: >221 
kW and <1200 kW, 
<385 GT); small-
scale: <221 kW, 
<111 GT; 
coastal:<80 GT. 
Vessels are treated 
similarly with a fleet 
segment but not 
between fleet 
segments. 
No 
Economic criteria 
are inherent in the 
flexible approach 
to maximize 
production. 
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Sprat, turbot 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
Total quota pool 
(sprat), 
individual quota 
(turbot) 
Historical landings 
plus points for 
captain/crew on an 
employment 
contract, and if 
captain/crew is less 
than 30 years old. 
Historical landings 
verified based on the 
fleet register, 
logbooks, sales 
notes. Points for 
employment are 
verified with a copy 
of the contracts. 
Points-based 
system based on 
transparent criteria 
published online. 
There is an 
incentive to 
hire crew on 
contract and 
to hire 
young crew. 
Points for acoustic 
devices for 
repelling 
cetaceans, and for 
smaller vessels 
(proxy for 
environmental 
impact). 
Effort 
fisheries 
Sea snails, horse 
mackerel, red 
mullet 
Licences One year Total effort Historical landings. 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
C
ro
a
ti
a
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Bluefin tuna, 
swordfish, 
anchovy, sardines 
Catch 
quota 
One to 
several 
years 
Individual quota 
(BFT), total 
quota pool 
(anchovy, 
sardines) 
Historical landings. 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
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Effort 
fisheries 
Hake, sole, deep-
water rose shrimp, 
anchovy, sardines, 
Norway lobster 
Licences 
Three 
years 
Total effort 
Five criteria to 
preserve traditional 
fishing and alleviate 
deprivation: local 
residence, old age, 
disability, war 
veterans, and low 
income. 
Residence: duration 
according to the 
census; age: 50+ 
years; disability: 
degree; low-income: 
monthly income. 
Points-based 
system based on 
transparent criteria 
published online. 
Marginal 
(e.g. 
changing 
residence). 
No 
C
y
p
ru
s
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Bluefin tuna, 
swordfish 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
Individual quota 
(large-scale); 
total quota pool 
(small-scale) 
Historical landings. 
Large and small-
scale allocation 
systems separated 
at 24m. 
Communicated to 
associations in a 
preparatory 
meeting. 
No No 
Effort 
fisheries 
Bogue, surmullet, 
parrotfish, picarel, 
red mullet 
Licences One year Total effort 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
D
e
n
m
a
rk
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Herring, sprat, 
cod, plaice 
Catch 
quota 
16 years 
Individual 
transferable 
quota (sector), 
individually 
rationed quota 
pool (coastal 
fleet) 
Historical landings, 
Fishfund helps young 
entrants into TAC 
fisheries. 
New entrants defined 
as under 40 years 
also. Quota is loaned 
for 8 years after 
which the quota is 
returned to the pool. 
Developed in a 
technical working 
group with fisheries 
associations and 
NGOs. Codified in a 
national executive 
order. 
Marginal 
(gear for the 
coastal 
fleet) 
Protected quota 
bonus for under 
17m passive gears 
(coastal fleet). 
E
s
to
n
ia
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Herring, northern 
shrimp, sprat, cod 
Catch 
quota 
Indefinite 
(ITQs), 
one year 
(IQs) 
Individual 
transferable 
quota, individual 
quota 
Division of quota 
between coastal and 
trawl fleet considers 
sufficiency for the 
coastal fleet. 
Reference period 
1998-2000. 
The historical 
fishing rights of 
applicants is 
published. 
No 
Spatial access 
reserved for the 
coastal fleet 
through a 20m 
isobath limitation 
for the trawl fleet. 
Herring 
fishery 
Herring Days at sea Indefinite 
Individual 
transferable 
effort 
Division of effort 
between coastal and 
trawl fleet considers 
sufficiency for the 
coastal fleet. 
Reference period 
1998-2000. 
The historical 
fishing rights of 
applicants is 
published. 
No No 
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Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Herring, sprat, 
salmon 
Catch 
quota 
10 years 
Individual 
transferable 
quota (herring, 
sprat, salmon), 
total quota pool 
(cod) 
Historical landings, 
quota reserve for 
new entrants (4%) 
held for five years as 
non-transferable 
quota. 
3 best years over a 
5-year refence 
period. 
Claims of increased 
fishing to establish 
a track record. 
No 
Limit on 
transferability 
from trap-net to 
trawl. 
F
ra
n
c
e
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Sole, hake, 
Norway lobster, 
mackerel, cod, 
plaice, whiting 
Catch 
quota 
Undefined 
Individual quota 
(PO members), 
total quota pool 
(non-PO 
members) 
Historical landings, 
socio-economic 
balance, quota 
reserve for SSF and 
new entrants, 
contribution to the 
local economy. 
Reference period 
2001-2003. When a 
vessel changes 
owner 20% of the 
track record goes to 
the government; 1% 
of quota in national 
quota pool for non-
PO vessels. 
In practice, mostly 
allocated on 
historical landings 
but unclear. 
Underestimation of 
SSF landings. 
Allocation practices 
with POs only 
known by the PO 
board of directors. 
Marginally 
(in practice, 
mostly 
allocated on 
historical 
landings). 
Market orientation, 
provisions in the 
Code Rural to 
allocate track 
records from the 
national reserve to 
low-impact fishers. 
Effort 
fisheries 
Oysters, lobsters, 
gilthead seabream, 
red mullet, 
Mediterranean sole 
Licences One year Total effort 
Historical landings, 
fishing port, fleet 
segment. 
No information 
collected 
Licenses attributed 
by Regional Fishing 
Committees based 
on the same three 
criteria (track 
records, 
socioeconomic and 
market orientation). 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
G
e
rm
a
n
y
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Cod, saithe, 
herring, plaice, 
mackerel, 
Greenland halibut 
Catch 
quota 
Undefined 
Individual quota 
(full time), 
individually 
rationed quota 
pool (part time) 
Historical landings, 
income from fishing 
activity and total 
income, previous 
employment in the 
fishery. 
Reference period 
1986-7 (North Sea) 
and 1989-90 (Baltic 
Sea), previous 
employment in the 
fishery and 3-year 
training, share of 
income from fishing. 
No information 
collected 
Additional 
days at sea 
for vessels 
that avoid 
cod by-catch 
by moving 
fishing 
grounds. 
Efficiency and 
sufficient market 
supply also listed 
in the fisheries 
law. 
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Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Bluefin tuna, 
swordfish 
Catch 
quota 
One year Total quota pool 
Points received for 
historical landings, 
place of permanent 
residence (small 
islands), minor 
children or children 
with a disability, 
vessels <12m, crew 
<4 people. Two 
annual authorisations 
for young entrants. 
Historical landings 
based on two 
previous years. 
Young entrants are 
fishers under 40 who 
have not had a tuna 
fishing authorisation 
before. 
Points-based 
system 
Marginally 
(employ 
fewer people 
or to base in 
a remote 
island). 
Points received for 
two permanently 
fitted refrigerators, 
low-impact fishing 
gears. 
Effort 
fisheries 
Red mullet, hake, 
surmullet, 
octopus, albacore 
tuna 
Licences Two years Total effort 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
Ir
e
la
n
d
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Mackerel, herring, 
cod, blue whiting, 
horse mackerel, 
boarfish, mackerel, 
sole, plaice, 
whiting, haddock, 
megrim, Norway 
lobster 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
Individually 
rationed quota 
pool (most), 
individual quota 
(mackerel, horse 
mackerel, blue 
whiting, 
boarfish). 
Pelagic species: 
historical landings. 
Demersal species: 
vessel length and the 
consultation of the 
Quota Management 
Advisory Committee 
(QMAC). Separate 
mackerel and herring 
quota pools for 
artisanal fishers. 
Different reference 
periods for different 
pelagic species. 
Vessel length set at 
16.76m. Monthly 
assessment of quota 
uptake and 
production by QMAC. 
QMAC meeting 
proceedings are not 
publicly available. 
Recommendations 
are formalised in 
Fisheries 
Management 
Notices published 
online. 
Marginal 
(artisanal 
quota 
pools). 
Occasionally quota 
allocations to 
incentivise low-
impact gear. A ban 
on trawling within 
the 6 nm zone and 
the Dunmore Box 
for herring 
spawning provides 
preferential spatial 
access. 
It
a
ly
 Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Bluefin tuna, 
swordfish, small 
pelagics 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
Individual quota 
(bluefin tuna), 
total quota pool 
(swordfish, 
Adriatic anchovy, 
sardines) 
Bluefin tuna: 
historical landings, 
total number of 
operators and 
people, productivity 
and profitability 
rates, economic 
activities generated. 
No information 
collected 
Ministerial decree 
published the 
ministerial website. 
No 
information 
collected 
Bluefin tuna days 
at sea: selectivity 
of fishing gear, 
impact of fishing 
gear on maritime 
safety, distance 
from the coast, 
specific control 
measures. 
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Non-coastal 
fisheries 
Herring, sprat, cod 
Catch 
quota 
One year Individual quota 
Quota allocated to 
local governments 
who give preference 
to fishers who 
operate locally. 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
Coastal 
fisheries 
Herring, cod, 
flounder, round 
goby 
Number of 
gears 
One year Total effort 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
L
it
h
u
a
n
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Distant 
water fleet 
Jack mackerel, 
horse mackerel, 
northern prawn, 
sardines 
Catch 
quota 
15 years 
Individual 
transferable 
quota 
Historical landings; 
contribution to 
national taxes. 
3 highest of the 
previous 10 years 
before allocation. 
Track record 
increased by the 
taxed component 
multiplied by 2. 
All criteria for the 
allocation of 
transferable fishing 
concessions are 
clearly defined in 
the Law on 
Fisheries. 
No 
Some incentives 
for low-impact 
fishing gear but 
incentive limited 
by 15-year 
allocations. 
Baltic fleet Cod, smelt 
Catch 
quota 
One year Total quota pool 
Historical landings; 
contribution to the 
local economy. 
Best three years out 
of the last 10 years 
before the allocation. 
Track record is 
increased by 0.3% 
for each 1% sold at 
Lithuanian auction in 
the past 3 years. 
No information 
collected 
Local 
economy 
criterion 
incentivises 
landings to 
certain 
ports. 
Track record 
increased by 5% if 
≥50% of the 
fishing 
opportunities in 
the past 3 years 
caught with low-
impact gears. 
M
a
lt
a
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Bluefin tuna, 
swordfish 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
Individual 
transferable 
quota (bluefin 
tuna), total 
quota pool 
(swordfish) 
Bluefin tuna quota 
has been used to 
introduce a new 
small-scale fishery. 
This increased the 
economic resilience 
of fishers as their 
income was 
supplemented by a 
new species. 
In 2019, part of the 
increase in the 
bluefin tuna TAC was 
reserved for small-
scale coastal vessels 
with a licence for two 
years. 52 new small-
scale fishers took up 
this opportunity. 
Consultations, 
meetings and/or 
discussions 
attended by 
fisheries 
stakeholders. 
No 
The increase in 
bluefin tuna to 
small-scale fishers 
used low-impact 
fishing gear (hook 
and line). 
Effort 
fisheries 
Dolphinfish, red 
porgy, red 
scorpionfish, 
octopus, bogue 
Licences Indefinite Total effort 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
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Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Sole, plaice, cod, 
turbot, whiting, 
sprat, mackerel, 
horse mackerel, 
Norway pout, blue 
whiting, herring, 
Catch 
quota 
Undefined 
Individual 
transferable 
quota, individual 
quota (sprat) 
Historical landings. 
Quota is allocated to 
a MFL1 vessel 
andquota only 
transferable to other 
quota owners. 
No need as 
transferable fishing 
concessions are used 
No need as 
transferable fishing 
concessions used 
No 
 Some quota 
reserved for 
landings <50kg 
SSF 
shellfish 
Hand-picked 
oyster 
Catch 
quota 
Daily 
Individually 
rationed quota 
pool 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
Effort 
fisheries 
Dab Licence Indefinite Total effort 
MFL2 licence 
attached to vessel 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
P
o
la
n
d
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Herring, sprat, 
cod, plaice 
Catch 
quota 
Undefined 
Individual quota 
(large-scale 
fleet), total 
quota pool 
(coastal fishery, 
all Baltic plaice) 
Allocation to vessel 
groups is not based 
on criteria but varies 
according to 
changing 
circumstances such 
as stock status. 
Vessel size 
There is a quota 
allocation advisory 
group of fisher 
representatives. 
Two year 
'use it or 
lose it' 
clause 
incentivises 
uptake, 
No 
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Anchovy, 
anglerfish, 
sardines, megrim, 
Norway lobster, 
hake, horse 
mackerel 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
Individually 
rationed quota 
pool (most), 
individual 
transferable 
quota (hake), 
total quota pool 
(horse mackerel) 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
Alfonsino Alfonsino 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
No information 
collected 
Geography 
(outermost region) 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
Marginal 
No information 
collected 
Norway 
lobster 
Norway lobster 
Catch 
quota 
Undefined 
Individual quota 
(trawlers), total 
quota pool (other 
fleets) 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
Use it, 
donate it, or 
lose it clause 
incentivises 
uptake. 
No information 
collected 
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Non-quota 
fisheries 
Octopus, cuttlefish Licences One year Total effort 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
R
o
m
a
n
ia
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Turbot 
Catch 
quota 
One year Individual quota Vessel length 
<10m, 10-15m, 
15m+ 
Criteria stated in 
the law 
No 
Environmental: 
vessel length, 
whether the vessel 
has an engine, 
economic: quota 
uptake 
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
 
Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Small pelagics 
(anchovy, 
sardines) 
Catch 
quota 
One year Total quota pool Historical landings 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
Effort 
fisheries 
Sole, gilthead 
seabream, 
pandora, seabass 
Licences Indefinite Total effort Historical landings 
No information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
No 
information 
collected 
No information 
collected 
S
p
a
in
 
Non-coastal 
fleet 
Blue whiting LSF 
Catch 
quota 
One year Individual quota Historical landings 
First sale notes and 
landing declarations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
No information 
collected 
Non-coastal 
fleet 
Horse mackerel 
Catch 
quota 
One year Individual quota 
Historical catches 
(including discards) 
Reference period 
2013-2018 
No 
No information 
collected 
Coastal 
fleet 
Horse mackerel, 
Purse seiners (8b) 
Catch 
quota 
One year Individual quota 
Historical landings; 
quota consumption 
Historical allocation; 
quota consumption 
No 
No information 
collected 
Coastal 
fleet 
Horse mackerel, 
Purse seiners (8c, 
9a) 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
Individual quota, 
co-managed 
quota pool 
(cofradias) 
Historical landings; 
GT 
Historical catches 
(70% first sale 
notes); GT (30%) 
No Vessel (GT) 
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Coastal 
fleet 
Mackerel, Purse 
seiners (8c, 9a) 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
Individual quota, 
co-managed 
quota pool 
(cofradias) 
Historical landings 
Average of two 
scenarios: 70% 
historical landings 
and 30% GTs vs. 
70% historical 
landings, 10% GTs, 
10% crew members, 
and 10% lineal 
distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
stated in the law. 
Specific criteria for 
species, stock and 
distribution among 
gears published in 
regulation through 
the Official Journal 
(BOE). Aim to 
include all fleet 
segments and 
geographical 
distribution. 
Allocation discussed 
with fisheries 
organizations. 
Reference years for 
some criteria may 
introduce bias for 
some species. 
No 
Vessels (GT). For 
mackerel fleets in 
8bc and 9, 7% of 
quota is allocated 
to vessels <50 
GTs for catches 
during the second 
semester.  
Coastal 
fleet 
Mackerel 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
Co-managed 
quota pool 
(federation of 
cofradias) 
Geographical 
distribution 
By province (NUTS 
III level) 
Marginal 
No information 
collected 
Non-coastal 
fleet 
Hake 
Catch 
quota 
Indefinite 
Individual 
transferable 
quota 
Historical landings 
 
No 
No information 
collected 
Coastal 
fleet 
Hake gillnets 
Catch 
quota 
Indefinite 
Individual 
transferable 
quota 
Number of vessels in 
the fishery; 
employment; 
historical landings 
50% equal 
distribution by 
vessel; 25% 
employment; 25% 
historical landings.  
Yes 
No information 
collected 
Coastal 
fleet 
Hake, purse 
seiners, trawlers, 
SSF, Longline 
Catch 
quota 
One year 
Co-managed 
quota pool 
(cofradías) 
Historical landings; 
socioeconomics; 
exclusivity in the 
hake fisheries. 
First sale notes and 
landing declarations 
2002-2009. 
No 
No information 
collected 
Coastal 
fleet 
Hake, SSF 
Catch 
quota 
Less than 
a year 
Total effort 
Maximum annual 
catch per vessel 
Set at 10,000 
kg/vessel. If 
exceeded, the vessel 
is removed from the 
fishery. 
No 
No information 
collected 
Coastal 
fleet 
Nephrops 
Catch 
quota 
One year Individual quota 
Historical landings, 
socioeconomic 
dependence. 
80% historical 
catches; 20% 
socioeconomic 
dependence. 
No 
No information 
collected 
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Coastal 
fleet 
Sardine 
Catch 
quota 
One year Total quota pool 
Quota uptake, quota 
reserve for 
traditional gear. 
2.5% quota reserve. Yes 
Higher catch limit 
for traditional 
gear. 
All Bluefin tuna 
Catch 
quota 
Indefinite 
Individual 
transferable 
quota, total 
quota pool 
Historical landings, 
employment. 
 
Yes 
Environmental 
criteria considered 
but dismissed due 
to similar fleet 
performance 
Quota 
swaps 
Mackerel 
Catch 
quota 
Ad hoc 
Individual quota, 
total quota pool 
Needs assessment. 
Economic value in 
the last 3 years. 
40% based on 
regular distribution, 
60% fleet in need. 
Yes 
Gear selectivity 
(≥20% reduction 
in bycatch, ≥20% 
reduction in 
catches below 
minimum size). 
S
w
e
d
e
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Pelagic 
Herring, sprat, 
sandeel 
Catch 
quota 
10 years 
(active 
gear), one 
year 
(passive) 
Individual 
transferable 
quota (active 
gear), total 
quota pool 
(passive) 
Historical landings, 
separated quota for 
coastal passive gear 
fleet. 
No information 
collected 
 
Before deciding an 
allocation system, 
all the criteria are 
discussed with 
representatives of 
fisheries 
organisations, 
municipals, 
scientists and other 
interested parties. 
No Separate 
allocations for the 
passive gear fleet 
(i.e. low-impact). 
Additional 
quantities of 
Norway lobster 
have in the last 
years been 
allocated to the 
selective fishing 
methods within 
this fishery (pots 
and trawl with 
selective grid). 
Demersal 
Cod, plaice, 
Norway lobster 
Catch 
quota 
10 years 
(active 
gear), one 
year 
(passive) 
Individual 
leasable quota 
(active gear), 
total quota pool 
(passive) 
Historical landings; 
separated quota for 
coastal passive gear 
fleet. 
No information 
collected 
No 
Shrimp Shrimp 
Catch 
quota 
10 years 
Individual 
leasable quota 
Historical landings; 
regional fishing 
opportunities. 
Based on ration class 
and active fishing 
months. Typically 
benefits less active 
vessels (i.e. smaller 
vessels). 
No 
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Catch 
quota 
fisheries 
Cod, haddock, 
mackerel, herring, 
hake, whiting, 
monkfish, sole, 
plaice 
Catch 
quota 
Undefined 
Individual 
transferable 
quota (sector), 
individually 
rationed quota 
pool (non-sector 
and pools) 
Historical landings; 
underpinning of TAC 
for pools of under 
10m vessels. 
Register of buyers 
and sellers 1994-
1996 
Detailed rules 
published online. 
Under 10m vessels 
were not required 
to record landings 
during the 
reference period. 
No, 
unintended 
effect of 
some 
vessels 
switching to 
9.9m 
vessels 
(super under 
10s). 
Under 10m pool 
underpinned 
quota, quota top-
sliced quota from 
2013, and 
received extra 
quota from ‘top-
ups’. Mackerel box 
provides 
preferential spatial 
access. 
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4.4 Discussion and summary of findings 
The use of social criteria in EU fisheries is still in its infancy. Not only is Article 17 and the 
requirement to use social criteria in the allocation of fishing opportunities a new addition in the 
most recent CFP reform, since CFP adoption there have been very few studies in this space. 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of this gap is in the paucity of Member State impact assessments. 
The Commission’s 2020 request to Member States to provide information on their allocation 
system included a question on impact assessment and only two Member States (Sweden and 
Denmark) reported conducting such an assessment. As for the Member States who failed reply to 
the request, no additional examples of impact assessments were uncovered by the EWG. 
In such a new area of study, the findings recorded here should be treated with caution. Some of 
this information was recorded for the first time or based on a single source. Furthermore, working 
in a new area of study makes assessment challenging as it requires a level of detailed 
understanding and confidence regarding each national system that was not present in the EWG. 
An assessment of whether a Member State is applying social criteria, as required by Article 17, is 
also an extremely sensitive conclusion, so the emphasis here has been to document information 
rather than provide a yes/no or traffic light judgement on national systems. This challenge was 
made even more difficult by the need to cover all 23 Member States with limited time to analyse 
each one in detail. 
Even with complete information and ample resources it may be difficult to come to a satisfactory 
assessment of the use of social criteria in the allocation of fishing opportunities. As noted above 
in definitions subsection, many criteria are social in nature - including extremely common criteria 
such as historical catches or vessel length - but fail to directly engage with many of the important 
social issues identified in EU fisheries. Therefore, even a fully comprehensive analysis would likely 
find high legal compliance with Article 17, but without the transformational change to EU fisheries 
that was anticipated when Article 17 when adopted. There are no recorded instances of Member 
States changing their allocations in 2014 when reformed CFP and Article 17 came into force, 
suggesting a minor or non-existent impact. Only one Member State (Ireland) cites Article 17 in its 
management rules and descriptions. 
In one high profile example, this compliance issue was put to the test when Greenpeace UK took 
the UK government to court over a failure to properly implement Article 17. The Greenpeace case 
rested on the failure to apply environmental criteria (rather than social criteria) and focused 
primarily on the disparity in allocations between the large-scale and small-scale fishing fleets 
despite the small-scale fleet having lower environmental impacts in many fisheries. The court 
ruled in the government’s favour, making the judgement that: “Whilst Article 17 obliges each 
Member State to include criteria of an environmental, social and economic nature, on the face of 
it, it is silent as to the weight to be ascribed to those criteria in the allocation process.” This ruling 
confirmed the wide discretion Member States have over the allocation of fishing opportunities. 
Although not specifically implemented because of Article 17 or any other legal requirement, the 
EWG did however find many examples of Member States using social criteria in the allocation of 
fishing opportunities (see previous table). Furthermore, when viewed across Member States, 
some trends are visible: 
 The historical catch criterion is the primary means of allocating fishing opportunities in 
every Member State; 
 In many systems a criterion (or multiple criteria) is used to separate the allocations of 
fishing opportunities for the small-scale fleet; 
 Most systems cannot be described as incentive-based as historical landings and vessel size 
are fairly fixed properties; 
 Social criteria are more commonly applied when ‘new’ quota is introduced (e.g. swaps with 
other member states in Spain, top-ups from the landings obligation in the UK) or when a 
fishing opportunity becomes more abundant (e.g. bluefin tuna quota in Spain and Malta); 
 There is a trend towards some systems of allocations (e.g. individual transferable quotas), 
but this is not universal (e.g. Poland); 
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION BEFORE 
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 There is a trade-off between the duration of fishing opportunities (i.e. the security of 
holdings) and the use of incentive-based allocations, as well as use of social criteria more 
broadly; 
 Newer systems (e.g. Finland, Swedish demersals) show evidence of learning from older 
systems (e.g. Netherlands), for example pairing individual transferable quotas with limits 
to duration and sectioning off a quota reserve for new entrants; 
 Some of the most innovative systems are in smaller Member States, possibly linked to a 
smaller number of stakeholders to organise. 
There does not appear to be any clear trend in the use of social criteria base on geography, type 
of fishing opportunity, or political culture. Some of the same social criteria are found in Member 
States in different seas, for both quota and effort, and for Member States with more or less 
protective social safety nets. Conversely, some neighbouring Member States with similar fisheries 
are nearly polar opposites in their allocation systems (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands). 
There are also examples of divergence between Member States including: 
 The treatment of age (e.g. targeting the young in Denmark, Bulgaria, Greece and the old 
in Croatia); 
 The role of stakeholders in the allocation process and which stakeholders are involved 
(e.g. NGOs and wider society); 
 System transparency (e.g a full in points-based assessment in Bulgaria and Greece 
contrasted with unclear assessment in France and Italy); 
 System flexibility between years (e.g. informal aspect of Poland’s system)and within a 
year (e.g. changes within the year in Belgium and Ireland); 
 System complexity (dozens of separate systems by species and area in Spain contrasted 
with a dismissal of social criteria in the Netherlands).  
It is also clear that not two Member States use the same system of allocating fishing 
opportunities or even the same mix of social criteria. While this was expected, it significantly 
complicates comparative assessment of systems because each Member State cannot be easily 
grouped with others. For system impact assessment, like TOR 3 considers, a case study approach 
is likely more appropriate. 
 
 
5 IMPACTS OF NATIONAL QUOTA ALLOCATION SYSTEMS ON SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY (TOR 3) 
Social impacts of quota allocation systems 
The assessment of social impacts requires among others metrics and a baseline to be compared 
with the situation after the introduction of the national allocation systems. As already studied in 
geographical areas with a longer trajectory in catch share programs, as the US, the establishment 
of causality in this context is problematic. The quota allocation system coexists with other factors 
that have a social impact in the fleets and their communities, as changes in market conditions, 
variability of target and non-target stocks, and other external drivers (as fuel prices, economic 
crisis or most recently the COVID19 crisis) for which it is not controlled for in the consulted 
literature. The coincidence of these causal factors is more common the longer the quota allocation 
system has been in place (Brinson and Thunberg, 2013). Therefore, we would interpret any 
results in terms of coexistence of social effects and quota allocation systems, not necessarily of 
causality. 
The conceptual definition of social impacts was not clear at the meeting and was merely deducted 
from the case studies in an intuitive manner. More work on this respect in cooperation with the 
ICES working group on social indicators (WGSOCIAL) was judged necessary on this topic. A brief 
literature review performed at the meeting identified some social impacts from studies outside 
the EU. In Australia, a review by Pascoe et al.(2017) identified the inequitable initial allocation, 
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the evolution of non-quota owners and lease-dependent fishers, the concentration of quota, the 
conflicts with cultural norms and traditional ways of life, the nature (full time vs part time) and 
remuneration of employment, the quality of fish, the safety of fishing operations, the asset value 
of quotas, the access to newcomers and the capturing and redistributing of resource rent. For the 
US, a review by Olson (2011) also identifies changes in employment size, structure and quality 
(e.g. fishing vs processing), and adds the shift in activity from small ports to larger ones, the 
change in the occupation of family members, the possibility of community and cooperative quota, 
working conditions, debt dependency etc. In addition to these reviews on concrete impacts, other 
literature from outside the EU has tackled the issue of designing an analytical framework for the 
design and assessment of quota allocation, such as Smith et al. (2019) and Clay et al. (2013). 
While more studies are based on participation and/ or indicators (e.g. based on employment, 
Curtin Keating 2017) some studies with anthropological methodologies also exist (Donkersloot et 
al. 2020). 
The comparative analysis before-after the introduction of the quota allocation system, together 
with an identification of claims and objectives are critical to assess whether allocation criteria 
have been designed to introduce shifts in the system or to preserve the status quo. The depth 
and breadth of the changes vary greatly across MS. The analytical framework of Döring et al. 
(2016) was presented at the EWG as a possible first step to analyse the design of allocation 
criteria under an equity lens, by disentangling the different conceptual elements of the design. 
Despite their design by the government, some quota allocations in Europe under the form of ITQ 
systems can be viewed as a delegation of management to the market. In this respect, some MS 
as The Netherlands and Finland have justified their lack of application of article 17 by affirming 
that the state no longer has the possibility to establish quota allocation criteria. Despite this 
delegation, the quota allocation mechanism (in this case, the national quota market), has some 
social effects, In this respect TOR 3 is still applied and the example of The Netherlands is 
presented further below. 
Overall, historical catches are used by all MS, pointing out an interest to maintain the status quo 
and protect the previous investment of fishers (Smith et al. 2019). On the contrary, only a few 
MS use more social criteria, such as percentages of national/young crew or national marketing of 
landings. Assessing the impact of combined criteria will be relevant for further improvements 
across the systems.  
 
Methodology  
The TOR presents some continuities and some differences with TOR 2. As a continuity to TOR 2, 
allocation criteria were used to analyse their possible social impact. As a difference, this TOR 
focuses exclusively on quota allocation systems (as opposed to fishing opportunities, that also 
include e.g. effort measures) and has a particular focus on the small-scale fishery. 
The work was undertaken in cooperation with the team addressing TOR 2 in a sequential manner, 
to better allocate the resources available under the form of expertise and limited time at the 
meeting. The methodological approach consisted in the following steps. 
1. A collection of literature (both grey and peer review) prior to the meeting on the topics of 
allocation criteria and social impact of allocation systems 
2. An examination of the allocation criteria in the answers provided by the Member States to 
DGMARE for the meeting as well as additional sources. For those Member States that did not 
provide a reply, primary sources (e.g. legislation) and secondary sources (experts and experts 
consultations) were combined. 
3. A grouping of the criteria according to the categories extracted from the literature 
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4. A literature analysis on selected EU case studies to identify social impacts related to some 
of the allocation criteria from the previous step, as well as their use of qualitative and 
quantitative data. 
5. Drafting of recommendations for the assessment of social impact and specification of 
related data needs (both quantitative and qualitative) 
Accordingly, the work plan consisted on a first step to collaborate with the TOR 2 team to identify 
criteria in the MS answers and additional literature on criteria, and subsequent steps where the 
group produced a table grouping quota allocation criteria and identifying their particularities 
(Table 5.1) and individual experts linked them to social impacts assessed in the literature, then 
reaching a consensus with the group. Finally, the recommendations and data needs were derived. 
The table classifying the quota allocation criteria divided these criteria first in those specific for 
small scale fisheries. Then a second section of the table presented the most common social 
criteria (see TOR2 for definition): those based on a historical record of catches and those with a 
community dimension (including the promotion of insular communities). In a third section the 
table displays social criteria based on employment, from employment requirements (such as 
training), to particularities of the owner and the crew and schemes for young fishers and 
newcomers to the fishery. The fourth section of the table shows some management criteria, as 
the obligation to sell the landings in a national auction, the existence of entry fees (or cost 
recovery), limits to transferability and concentration and issues of compliance, incentives and 
safety requirements. Table 5.1 presents some other broad types of criteria that, not being social, 
may have social impacts, such as spatial, environmental and economic criteria. The table also has 
space to flag Member States where a shift in quota from the SSF to the LSF has occurred or could 
potentially occur. 
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Table 5.1: Classification of national quota allocation criteria  
Criteria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Denmark Estonia Finland 
SSF   
 Vessels less than 10 meters receive 5 points, from 10.01 to 11.99 meters – 
3 points, 12 and more – 1 point.(see environmental) n.a.   Closed system for coastal fishers     
Historical  Yes Priority for those with history in turbot n.a. Yes Yes Yes 
3 best years of a 5 
year period 
Community (incl. Insularity) See crew national   n.a.         
Training in fishing     n.a.         
Employment   Incentive to hire crew on contract n.a.         
Owner on board     n.a.         
Crew national 
Economic link for "quota hoppers": 50% of crew 
must reside "in the region of the Belgian 
coast"and/or at least 50% of annual catch is 
marketed through Belgian auctions   n.a.         
Young fishers   One point if the captain/crew member is under 30 n.a.   
Young fishers (<40 yrs) buying their first vessels get a 
quota loan for 8 years , which can be allocated to other 
young newcomers then. "Fisheries fund scheme"     
Newcomers   
Newcomers can enter the quota competition if they meet the criteria and 
have enough points. n.a.       
4% of the TAC was 
reserved as non-
transferable quotas 
for newcomers 
Auction national 
Landings registered in Belgian auction; 50% of 
landings market through Belgian auctions   n.a.         
Entry fee     n.a.         
Transferability 
Non-transferability without possibility to 
circumvent   n.a.   (See SSF-->LSF)   
Excluding the quota 
under the 
newcomers´scheme 
Concentration cap     n.a.         
Duration 
Maximum one year, use rights allocated twice a 
year One year n.a.   16 yrs   10 yrs 
Incentives based No Points system: employement, size... n.a.   
Fishfund can be used as an incentive for fishers to 
participate in research or trial innovative technologies     
Compliance     n.a.         
Maritime safety     n.a.         
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Spatial 
Allocations by area are common; also coastal 
fleet segment   n.a.         
Environmental 
"Generic" measures for the entire LSF: two types 
of escape panels 
Small fishing vessels, that usually consume less fuel and thus have less 
emissions and fishing activities are more environmental friendly 
One of the criteria is the number of installed active acoustic devices for 
repelling cetaceans, on their gillnets, used for catching turbot, example – if 
the fishing vessel has 1 installed device it receives 1 point, if it has 5 or more 
devices it received 5 points. n.a.     
fishing depth, fishing 
methods and gear 
restrictions   
Economic See crew national   n.a.       
(Economic 
efficiency) 
SSF --> LSF 
LSF better represented and with more access to 
quota, but SSF seems well-protected against this   n.a.   Limit to transferability: not possible from SSF to LSF     
 
Criteria France Germany Greece Ireland 
SSF 
Most SSF in "non-PO affiliation"segment. Mostly dependent on licenses, 
implying non quota species, due to quota restrictions (1% of national quotas)   
For Bluefin Tuna more points for SCF 
(vessels<12m) and crew of up to 4 
persons 
Quota allocations set aside for polyvalent fishers without track records (artisanal gillnet 
and hook and line fishing, herring ringnets and surface longlining of albacore tuna) 
Historical  
General rule: historical track records 2001-2003; some POs also consider 
other criteria (e.g., 2008-2010 or maximum yearly catch in past 10 years) 
Period 1986-7 and 1989-90 for the North Sea and 
Baltic Sea respectively Last 2 years for large pelagics 
In demersal fisheries catch limits generally take account of the length of fishing vessels 
with large vessels being allocated double that of smaller fishing vessels; the market 
situation for fish; and in certain fisheries the allocation takes into account the type of 
fishing gear deployed. In pelagic fisheries, allocations take account of historic activity 
for the relevant fleet segment. Within these allocations, it has regard for the length of 
fishing vessels and or the historic fishing pattern of the vessels in the segment. 
Community (incl. 
Insularity) 
Insularity: provisions apply for Overseas Areas but not for mainland France (at 
least not in fisheries legislation; general tax exemptions apply)   
a)Place of permanent residence (small 
island) b) minor or disabled children   
Training  Only indirectly (for statut armateur-shipowner) 3 yrs training in fisheries required      
Employment (not directly it seems) Previous employment in the fishery     
Owner on board 
Not for allocations directly but an important criterion for the definition of 
"artisanal" fishing operations: embarked-owner, sole proprietorship, (family-
based fishing), vessel up to 25 m. This also corresponds to a firm statute 
(société de pêche artisanale) which is beneficial in terms of taxes and gives 
SSFs and young entrants the opportunity to a gradual acquisition of capital 
(and thus: track records and fishing opportunities)       
Crew national 
Not for allocations directly, but for establishment and operation of foreign-
owned firms (e.g. skipper has to follow course, pass exam, speak French)        
Young fishers 
20% preemption when vessel is sold, according to official documents to be 
redistributed to SSFs and newcomers (young fishers)   
Two (2) authorisations a year for fishermen 
under 40 years of age who have not had a 
tuna fishing authorisation before   
Newcomers 
20% preemption when vessel is sold, according to official documents to be 
redistributed to SSFs and newcomers (young fishers) 
A newcomers scheme was set up only in 2011, 
through which scrapping inactive vessels (and thus 
saving costs) was temporarily allowed with the 
condition that 5% of their quota would be allocated to 
newcomers.  (see young fishers) Expoitation licenses: no capacity rights set aside 
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Auction national (no; see Article R921-4 for "economic link")       
Entry fee         
Transferability 
No-with possibility to circumvent (de facto quota market through the vessels 
market)     Quotas are non-transferable and non-leasable 
Concentration cap 
None (non-transferability is considered enough but this is certainly not the 
case)     NA (But vessel power and capacity are capped within fleet segments) 
Duration Maximum one year (but perceived secure by operators) 1 year/y month   1 year 
Incentives based         
Compliance         
Maritime safety         
Spatial Spatial limitations for coastal fisheries (bande côtière)     See environmental below 
Environmental 
Some allocations (from the track records reserve) based on gears and 
environmental criteria   Use of selective techniques Ban on trawl fishing in 6 nm zone 
Economic   
% income from fishing, efficiency and sufficient market 
supply 
Improving quality of fish through the vessel 
has two permanently fitted refrigerators, 
fishing trips only 24h and only in Greek 
waters (vessel length), "market situation" 
SSF --> LSF 
The implicit price of fishing opportunities has prevented many SSFs from 
obtaining track records and even PO membership needed for accessing TAC 
species       
 
Criteria Italy Latvia Lithuania Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal 
SSF 
See spatial: minimum distance from the 
coast to avoid interaction with SSF n.a.   
Bluefin tuna quota has been used to 
introduce a new small-scale fishery. In 
2019, part of the increase in the bluefin 
tuna TAC was reserved for small-scale 
coastal vessels with a licence for two years   
Total quota pool <8m for central 
herring, <12m for sprat 
See spatial, also separate 
pools for small-scale and 
coastal fleets 
Historical  Yes n.a. Based on 3 best years out of 5/10   Yes 
Yes (different years for different 
TACs) Yes 
Community (incl. 
Insularity)   n.a. (see Economic)       See Spatial 
Training in fishing   n.a.           
Employment 
People involved in each fishing sector 
(unclear) n.a.           
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Owner on board   n.a.           
Crew national   n.a.           
Young fishers   n.a.     
Quota is only transferable to other quota 
owners (not outsiders) makes it nearly 
impossible for outsiders to buy ITQs.     
Newcomers   n.a. 
1% of quota for the Baltic Sea fleet and 5% for the distant 
fleet         
Auction national   n.a. 
The reference data shall be increased by 0.3 per cent for 
each per cent of the fish sold at the local auction in Lithuania 
during the last 3 calendar years, calculated from all fish of 
particular species caught by the operator during the same 
year.   
Obligation to sell through a Dutch 
auction (for transparency)     
Entry fee   n.a.           
Transferability   n.a.     See young fishers above 
Leasability was removed in 
2017   
Concentration cap   n.a.           
Duration 1 year n.a. 15 years (annual auction) 2 years for SSF 5 years if not fishing 
2 years "user it or lose it" (back 
to the state)   
Incentives based   n.a. See auction national above         
Compliance 
 Specific control and/or observation 
measures applicable to each fishing sector n.a.           
Maritime safety 
Impact of each fishing gear in terms of 
maritime safety; n.a.           
Spatial 
Distance from the coast of the fishing area 
related to each fishing sector are regulated n.a. see econ       
Geography (outermost 
region), e.g. 85% of 
Alfonsino TAC to Azores 
Environmental 
Selectivity of each fishing gear, considering 
its technical capacity to avoid and/or 
reduce under-minimum sized and/or 
accidental catches (especially in terms of 
non-targeting species as well as protected 
ones) n.a. 
incentives are provided to fishing vessels deploying selective 
fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced 
environmental impact 
Sustainable exploitation of marine 
biological resources.increase in quota to 
small-scale fishermen that use hook and 
line (low-impact fishing gear).       
Economic 
Productivity and profitability rates of each 
fishing sector; - economic activities 
generated by each fishing sector. n.a. 
contribution to the local economy, (ancillary industry?) 
incentivises landings to certain ports 
increased the economic resilience of 
fishers as their income was supplemented 
by fishing for a new species       
SSF --> LSF   n.a.           
 
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION BEFORE 
REVIEW BY THE STECF 
 
53 
Criteria Romania Slovenia Spain Sweden UK 
SSF     
Maximum year catch (10000kg per year) to protect 
smallest SSF from bigger SSF boats doing olympic fishing 
SSCF fishing with passive gears for which unallocated quotas are 
reserved.A model other than historical fishing, based on previous ration 
class and active fishing months, is used for the distribution of North Sea 
shrimp. This generally means that the less active vessels (mainly 
smaller vessels) benefit compared with if the distribution took place 
according to historical fishing. 
Under 10m vessels are managed in pools. In 2011 
underused quota was permanently transferred from 
POs to the pool. Quota top-ups for the landing 
obligation have also been disproportionately allocated 
to the pools. 
Historical  
Quota allocated to the vessel in the fishing area allocated in the 
previous year Yes 
1st criteria. Check in October, according to last 5 yrs, 
individidual vessels/cofradia would be capable of catching 
their quota. If not, it would be redistributed. Yes 
Yes (1994-1996 through the register of buyers and 
sellers) 
Community (incl. 
Insularity)       See spatial 
Must meet one of four economic link conditions: 50% 
of of landed weight to the UK, 50% of crew days by UK 
nationals, 50% of operating expenditure, donating 10% 
of the value of catch landed overseas to the undero 
10m pool 
Training in fishing           
Employment           
Owner on board           
Crew national         See community 
Young fishers           
Newcomers           
Auction national           
Entry fee           
Transferability     see flexibility comments   
Quota transfers need to be approved. Quota cannot be 
transfered out of the Under 10m pools. 
Concentration cap           
Duration         Legal ambiguity 
Incentives based     See historical   See environmental below 
Compliance 
Fulfilling the reporting obligations according to European and 
national legislation (functional equipment VMS, sending 
notifications in time, sending first sale notes in time, monthly 
reports, fishing logbooks, catch reporting, periodic ANPA 
requests for data collection, for the previous year, etc)         
Maritime safety           
Spatial See historical   Geographic distribution of quota conflictive. 
Different areas correspond to different migration stages of 
Another way in which the system considers social (and regional) 
criterions is so-called regional fishing opportunities. 
The mackerel box in Cornwall is reserved for under 
10m fishers using hook and line 
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BFT (Canary islands; Basque quota sold to Andalusia) 
Environmental 
Environmental: Type of vessel - i.e. length/fleet segment, with 
or without engine     
Upon governmental assignment, SwAM will further investigate the 
creation of incentives for fishing vessels using selective and 
environmentally friendly fishing gear, including reduced energy 
consumption and damage to habitats in line with Art 17  
The Scottish Conservation Credits scheme allocated 
additional days at sea to vessels using low-impact 
trawls 
Economic 
Achieving the quota allocated to the vessel in the fishing area 
allocated in the previous year   
Optimisation of the use of quota according to the 
gear/technical characteristics of the vessel   See Community above 
SSF --> LSF           
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Examples of social impacts of quota allocation in some EU MS 
In this section we focus on specific social impacts on small scale fisheries and shifts of quota from 
SSF to large scale fisheries. Redistribution of fishing opportunities through transactions between 
fishers is possible in most EU quota management systems, either through vessel transactions on 
the second-hand market (e.g., France, Ireland) and/or through quota trading in a formal quota 
market (e.g., Denmark, Netherlands, UK). In other countries (e.g., Belgium) neither is possible, 
and the administration takes on the role of efficiently redistributing fishing opportunities among 
fishers. 
Without the right measures in place, redistribution of quotas through market transactions may 
lead to “quota shifts” from small-scale fisheries (SSF) to large-scale fisheries (LSF). These shifts 
are usually assessed on the fleet segment level, based on vessel size (see the case of Denmark in 
Said et al., 2020). However, it was discussed in the group whether other elements of scale should 
be taken into account to draw a more complete picture. We argue that, in addition to vessel size, 
the number of vessels within a fishing firm is another important element for assessing quota 
shifts. We will illustrate this using the example of France. 
The definition of “artisanal” fisheries in France is based on two elements. The first is the profile of 
the owner-operator (embarked, invests his/her own capital, manages the firm technically and 
economically) (Debeauvais, 1985). The second element is the fishing vessel: the owner-operator 
operates 1 fishing vessel up to 25 meters. Vessels larger than that are considered large-scale 
(pêche industrielle). In practice, however, an increasing number of “artisanal” operators are seen 
to invest in multiple fishing fishing vessels < 25m (horizontal integration). One example is a 
fisher with 9 vessels of which 8 are under 12 meters (Kinds et al., in prep.). The question here is 
thus not how fishing opportunities flow from SSF to LSF, but how they are redistributed among 
fishers within the SSF (<12 m) segment. 
This not only presents a reduction of the number of independent SSF fishers per se, but also 
makes later redistribution of those vessels through acquisition difficult. This is related to the pre-
emption of 20% of track records when a vessel changes hands (no loss when the entire company 
is sold, i.e., the legal owner stays the same). To avoid such loss, prospective buyers would need 
to buy the entire company at once. This raises questions about access for peers (especially young 
skippers) as well as the socio-economic profile of future buyers and the loss of fishing capital 
from local fishing communities (Kinds et al., in prep.) 
Due to barriers to entry (institutional and other), some artisanal fishers have accepted co-
investment from large fishing firms, in order to be able to renew their fleet and invest in state-of-
the-art vessels (Kinds et al., submitted). In all observed cases (n=3), the artisanal fisher stays 
the majority shareholder, and thus has the legal title to the fishing opportunities attached to the 
vessel. More research is needed to assess this situation better, but it highlights the sometimes 
difficult access to sources of funding, and the route some fishers are willing to go.  
Social impacts in EU countries range from unbalanced allocation of initial quota due to 
controversial historical criteria in quota allocation (Spain) or malfunctioning concentration caps 
(Denmark), to unequal spatial distribution of quota due to lack of consideration of migration 
behaviour (Spain) or problems of efficiency under the form of wasteful use of quota (Spain, UK). 
Examples of criteria and possibly connected social impacts are given below. 
 
Denmark 
Quota allocation in Denmark is based on historic catch records and has two different systems for 
SSF. The limited coastal fishing scheme from 2007, based on vessel size, time at sea at historical 
track records, allocates extra VQS (Vessel quota shares) to those vessels with previous ownership 
of quota in a directly proportional way. A 2016 scheme, the “protected” (unlimited) coastal fishing 
scheme uses the same criteria as the above, in addition to this favours fishers using low impact 
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gears but prohibits the switch to LSF, providing significant extra quota allocation (about four 
times more as the previous scheme) as a compensation (Said et al. 2020). 
Other characteristics of the Danish system are the possibility of using quota as a collateral, the 
allowance to lease quota and the establishment of some limits to concentration (e.g. maximum 
5% of cod quota per fisher, Pascual et al. 2020). The implementation of the concentration limits 
was deficient according to the Danish National Audit Office, which noticed use of incomplete data 
to follow up existing concentration and lack of quality in the administration of quota operations 
(Pascual et al. 2020). 
The evolution of the fleets after the measures mentioned above included substantial 
concentration in large scale segments and access problems for SSF especially for younger fishers 
(see Fig. 5.1). As an example, only 58 fishers joined the newer, protected coastal fishing scheme, 
maybe because of the lower market value of their quota (Said et al., 2020). Spatial distribution 
effects have also taken place from smaller ports where the quota allocation was originally 
allocated to larger ports (Host 2015), and landing in foreign harbours has increased significantly 
(from 10% in 2004 to 20–25% in 2016, according to Pascual et al. 2020) with the negative social 
effects that this could imply for the smaller coastal communities. 
 
Figure 5.1: Evolution of the distribution of quota rights for demersal species. Quota ownership at 
31st December except for 2006, which corresponds to 1-1-2007 (Katzen et al. 2019). 
 
Malta 
In Malta quota is distributed according to historical records. In 2005 the purse seine fleet made 
inroads into the sector by leasing quotas. In 2009 a market-based governance system was 
introduced. The purse seine fleet controls the market of ITQ leasing. 
The organisation of the quota allocation system has allowed concentration in the ownership. The 
prices of fishing permits and quotas have increased, which together with limited access to capital 
difficults the access to quota. The SSF fisher is totally dependent on the ITQ leasing systems. This 
situation has led a concentration in the ownership towards LSF and to conflicts among fleets, 
(Said et al. 2020). 
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The Netherlands 
The quota allocation system in The Netherlands in based on historical records, however, it is not 
until 2007 that data was collect on SSF. Leasing quota is allowed, but only for fishers that already 
own quota, according to a regulation of 1985 (Hoefnagel and de Vos, 2017). This apparent equal 
access to quota for SSF and LSF is in practice a strong obstacle to access for the SSF (Carpenter 
and Kleinjans 2017). There is a limitation of 5 years that quota can be leased by someone not 
operating a vessel, after which the quota could return to the state (Hoefnagl and de Vos 2017). A 
part from the quota system, banks are reluctant to accept quota as a collateral for fishers to start 
their business. 
The social phenomena associated to this quota allocation system is a systemic difficulty for 
newcomers not belonging to a family with quota to access the sector. This is due to the 
prerequisite to own quota in order to lease it, but also to the high lease prices and the lack of 
access to funding. Concentration in the sector is difficult to establish, for instance in the fleets 
targeting sole, the species with the highest economic importance. Even though the number of 
gillnet fishers targeting sole declined from 48 to 12 in the period from 2013 to 2017 (Pascual et 
al. 2020), the inequality in the distribution of quota did not increase, and the decrease in landings 
and revenues was even larger than that of the number of fishers (Hoefnagel and de Vos, 2017). 
The amount of quota owned by non-active fishers was up to 30% of the total quota in 2010, but 
it has been reduced to 7% in 2016 “due to deaths of quota holders and selling of quota by heirs 
(Hoefnagel and de Vos, 2017). Considering participation, the Dutch system could be considered 
as giving the fisheries sector as a group a role as steering the quota allocation system from the 
state (van Hoof 2013). 
 
Portugal: ray 
For the analysis of the quota allocation system the EWG subgroup focused on the study limited to 
one particular species, rays, given the limited evidence available. The case study highlights the 
role of international organizations in EU quota allocation (IUCN and ICCAT) in particular for SSF. 
The classification of the undulate ray as an endangered species lead to a prohibition of catches, 
the ray fishers established a collaboration within an ongoing research project to get a license 
(experimental fisheries). The gear criteria to participate was the use of trammel nets, the fleet 
criteria, to be part of the local fleet and have as historical catches landings prior to 2016. The 
criteria changed in 2019 (after 5 years) to include other boats without large historical catches of 
the target species (ray) but catches of other two species. In addition to the criteria mentioned 
above, and according to MS data delivery on the application of article 17, licensing accounts for 
the economic dependence of communities involved in traditional fishing and the history of 
compliance. 
Said et al. (2020) point out that the extent to which the policy provides access to small-scale 
fishers at large through social justice criteria, and thus to the sustainable continuation of the 
sector, remains questionable. The quota allocation system generates winners and losers within 
the fleet due to the limited number of licenses. Restrictive quotas resulted from IUCN inclusion of 
the target species in the list of endangered species Quota limited are limited to SSF, excluding 
trawlers. Despite this, Pita and Gaspar (2020) remark that in general (beyond the ray CS) SSF do 
not have a differentiated consideration in terms of management, hence they are more exposed to 
competition with LSF 
 
Spain: Bluefin tuna 
The quota allocation system in Spain combines species, fisheries and fishing gears, defining a 
complex, tiered and multilevel system. For the blue fin tuna in the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean, the initial allocation in 2008 applied a historical criterion, but the time series 
considered benefited gears with intensive fishing capacity (purse seiners and almadrabas (large 
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traps)), that got around 60% of the quota (Said; Pascual-Fernández et al., 2020). Time series 
dismissed the impacts of large-scale fisheries development in the fleet segments’ recent records, 
excluding the facto traditional SSF fishing gears and in particular the Canary Islands hook-and-
line segment. Historical catches from longer time series showed this segment had more than 15% 
of the catches up to 1981 (Díaz de la Paz; Pascual Fernández et al., 2017). The criteria applied 
initially in quota distribution got the hook and line fleet from the Canary Islands in 2008 up to 
three percent of the quota, shared with other small-scale fleet and recreational fisheries, only as 
bycatch when targeting other species (Orden ARM/1244/2008, de 29 de abril). 
The quota allocation system has been, however, permeable to change. The perception of an 
unfair distribution was the driver to mobilize knowledge/power through the Regional Government 
of the Canary Islands and fisher organizations in the region, supported by University reports that 
challenged the regulations of the national government, by collecting information about historical 
catches and the comparatively small environmental impacts of the Canarian fleet. This evidence 
supported the sector and Regional governments claims and advocacy for changes in quota 
allocation. As a result, the initial allocation was reviewed and the SSF got an increase up to 
7,9263% of quota allocated (Real Decreto 46/2019, de 8 de febrero). It should be noted that this 
revision of quota distribution was facilitated by an improvement in the stock status and an 
increase in national quotas. 
 
UK 
In 1999, the UK Government formalised its quota allocation system by ending the use of three 
year rolling track records and freezing in place the 1994-1996 track records through the new 
system of ‘fixed quota allocations’ (Carpenter & Kleinjans, 2017). FQAs are split between 
producer organisations that manage quota on behalf of their members (‘the sector’) and vessels 
that fish from government quota pools (the ‘non-sector’ and ‘under 10m pools’). 
The use of FQAs fostered a more secure investment environment and significant purchases by 
both domestic and foreign fleets. The result of these investments is that large shares of UK quota 
are now held by foreign companies (e.g. Dutch ownership of English pelagic quota and Spanish 
ownership of Welsh demersal quota) (European Commission, 2019). 
Another long-standing impact of the UK quota management system is the exclusion of the small-
scale coastal fleet, defined in the UK as vessels under 10 metres in length. The method of initial 
allocation was based on the register of buyers and sellers, but in the 1990s under 10m vessels 
were not required to record their landings through this system. While this exclusion was intended 
to ease administrative burden, the result was the exclusion of the fleet from formal records and 
the initial FQAs. The UK government employed an estimation methodology for the under 10m 
fleet, but some fishers have complained that the methodology underestimated the true extent of 
their fishing. Without track records, under 10m vessels have also been effectively shut out from 
producer organisations, despite efforts to open up POs and for the newly created Coastal 
Producers Organisation to be delegated quota management responsibilities. Conversely, the 
under 10m pooling of quota and more limited reporting requirements also led to many vessels 
registering 9.9m - by far the most frequent vessel size in the UK fleet - with some fishers even 
modifying their vessels to fit under the 10m threshold (Davies et al., 2018). 
As FQAs accrued in value, and many TACs declined in size, under 10m fleet has struggled to gain 
a hold in quota fisheries. In 2012, the UK government ‘realigned’ consistently unused FQAs from 
the sector to the under 10m pools. This decision was challenged by the UK Association of Fish 
Producer Organisations and although the UK Government won the case in court, the judge 
confirmed that there had developed a “legitimate expectation” around quota shares had formed, 
despite this expectation being “built very much of sand” as “no-one can own the fish of the sea” 
(Carpenter, 2018). 
This legal ambiguity over quota holdings, also found in several other Member States, may be one 
of the major reasons why the UK quota allocation system has remained largely unchanged with 
reallocations only occurring at the margins. Besides the unused quota realignment, the UK 
government has also taken opportunities to allocate more quota to the under 10m pool through 
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the quota donations as part of the economic link licensing criteria, and a preferential allocation of 
quota that was received as ‘top-ups’ for the landing obligation. Taken as a whole, there has still 
been a concentration of quota in the sector compared to the under 10m pools, although this is 
mainly due to large, pelagic stocks (e.g. blue whiting) increasing in size. When analysed in terms 
of individual species rather than total tonnage, there has been a small shift towards the under 
10m pool (MMO, 2019). 
In the context of assessing impact, it is more clearly the case that the UK quota management 
system - extending from the legal ambiguity of the system - is not a dynamic force in UK 
fisheries, rather it has kept outcomes relatively constant. A lack of impact is an important social 
issue however, especially for those who feel excluded from the initial allocations or use fishing 
methods that they feel are more deserving (Gray et al, 2011). Recent UK policy texts suggest 
that the government is aware of the social dimension of quota allocation and would like to use 
‘new quota’ to help address these issues (Defra, 2018). 
 
Participation 
The social impact of the national allocation systems is also related to the participation in the 
fishery, first in the design process of the system and then in its implementation. Many Member 
States have declared different participation mechanisms to set the quota allocation criteria, 
including for example the geographical distribution of quotas in Spain involving the central 
governments, autonomous region governments and the associations of the long tradition 
“cofradias”. Another example is the Dutch system, which could be considered as giving the 
fisheries sector as a group a role as steering the quota allocation system from the state (van Hoof 
2013). 
For quotas allocated on a yearly basis and from a common pool quota (see TOR2), participation is 
frequently used as a mechanism to generate consensus, reduce conflict and generate buy-in 
among fleet segments and gears. 
For the importance of participation in the implementation of the national quota allocation system 
itself it would be interesting to look at the link between membership into fishers´ organization 
(POs, fisheries committees, cooperatives) and access to fishing quotas opportunities. Issues as 
access to knowledge and information, as well as power inside the decision structure, or access to 
credit in case of transferable quotas are of relevance for the social impact of quota regimes (Said 
et al. 2019), this analysis is beyond the resources available at the meeting. 
 
Data requirements for future social impacts assessments 
One of the most direct quantitative data needs would be the information at a regular basis on 
quota distribution before and after the initial allocation between SSF and LSF. This distribution 
has been observed in the literature and has also been delivered by several Member States for the 
questions prior to this meeting. Some examples of current distribution of quota among SSF and 
LSF can be seen in table 5.2 below. 
Other required information would be related to metrics used for incentives to receive quota, such 
as employment, age of employees, nationality of crew etc, before and after the introduction of 
the system. This information can be partly obtained from the DCF demographic data, but only 
when it is disaggregated at fleet segment. 
 
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION BEFORE 
REVIEW BY THE STECF 
 
60 
 
Table 5.2: Examples of quota distribution between SSF and LSF in the EU 
Member state/ Fishery % LSF % SSF 
Italy / BFT 63 % 2% 
Ireland / demersal 66 % (approx.) 33% (approx.) 
Estonia / herring Gulf of 
Riga 
54% 46% 
Estonia /herring rest of 
Baltic 
88.65% 11.35 % 
Estonia / Baltic salmon - 100% 
Greece / BFT 80%  (approx.) 20 % (approx.) 
 
Qualitative data requirements are in narrow connection with the study of community profiles 
undertaken in TOR 5. Some of the qualitative data needed for studies of impact include 
geographic information on migration of fish (see case study on BFT in the Canary Islands) or 
meteorological conditions that SSCF face. SSCF are more sensitive to adverse climate conditions 
even quota allocation criteria that are meant to improve the access of SSCF might deteriorate it if 
they do not consider this qualitative information. A case for this is for example the small-scale 
fishery for herring in the German Baltic. An example of this are the requirements to catch the 
quota in one year to be awarded quota on the next year. These criteria, which may foster stability 
in the SSCF, can also become a problem if external conditions prevent the SSCF vessels from 
fishing in a particular year. SSCF vessels have a more reduced mobility than LSF and are 
therefore more sensitive to thesis conditions. Examples of these are the impossibility to catch the 
German herring quota in some Baltic areas due to frost, or cases when the quota is set too low 
and it is not economically feasible to catch it considering the means of the SSCF, e.g. demersal 
stocks and the difficulty to catch certain very low quota (low catchability of the fish). Analysis of 
policy documents, Interviews and Participatory observations, online forums and media articles 
have proved useful for some of these analysis (Said et al. 2020), 
As said before, for the EU case there is not only qualitative and quantitative data requirements, 
but also the necessity to set up analytical frameworks to extract information from these data. 
 
Limitations of the different SSF definition 
In order to select the data to be used (e.g. DCF data) it is important to take into account the 
mismatch between the official EU definition of small scale fisheries (structural definition, under 
12, and passive gear) and the different national definitions of SSF (mostly functional definitions, 
e.g. see ICCAT below). The national definitions, employed in several quota allocation regimes, 
would require a higher data definition than that of the DCF (which is based on metier or segment 
for economic data, other groupings for demographic data). As an example of functional definition 
of SSF, there is the definition of another management body operation in the EU and beyond, 
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ICCAT, in its Recommendation 18/023 - For the purpose of this recommendation, "small scale 
coastal vessel" is a catching vessel with at least three of the five following characteristics: a) 
length overall <12 m; b) the vessel is fishing exclusively inside the territorial waters of the flag 
CPC c) fishing trips have a duration of less than 24 hours d) the maximum crew number is 
established at four persons, or e) the vessel is fishing using techniques which are selective and 
have a reduced environmental impact. 
As another example of nation definition, in Belgium there is no real SSF segment. "Coastal 
fisheries" denote a special statute more than a distinct fleet segment in terms of vessel sizes and 
gears. 
 
Conclusions 
Understanding the allocation criteria and the actual implementation are both important to assess 
the social impact of the national quota allocation systems in the EU. The answers of MS to the 
questions in preparation of this EWG whereas they provided the results of the quota allocation (in 
form of % quota ownership of major segments) and/or the criteria employed to achieve them 
have proven the availability of this information at national level. 
It should be noted that not only the allocation criteria for the distribution and the actual 
magnitude of quota being allocated but also the options to effectively utilise the quota do affect 
the actual operational distribution of the quota.. Member States should be aware e that quota 
criteria generate intended and unintended conditions. For instance, reaching the quota allocated 
in a given timeframe may be at odds with the weather conditions for SSF. Hence, criteria need to 
be context-dependent. These external conditions, especially relevant for SSF recommend the 
elaboration of community profiles (see section on data requirements below) and the delivery of 
both qualitative data on criteria and quantitative data on quota allocation before and after the 
allocation of quota, among others. 
Gathering information on the details of the quota allocation system is critical. The information 
provided by the MS has been useful for the initial analysis. A deeper understanding will benefit 
from disentangling compliance-oriented information (how the quota allocation system complies 
with art. 17) from design and implementation information (how the system was designed and 
how it is actually working).  
This and similar EWG could set incentives for MS to cooperate in the data submission and boost 
their participation processes by providing evidence-based information and showing relevant 
analysis to stakeholders. The group is aware of the value of the information we are asking for but 
we are also aware that some departments providing the information might be overloaded and/or 
understaffed; therefore we recommend the optimisation of the process of obtaining the 
information by coordination from different surveys. The field of assessment of allocation of quotas 
is relatively young in the EU compared to other geographic areas and this brings difficulties in 
order to contrast the information received with relevant scientific literature. This lack of literature 
refers not only to empirical values for before and after, but also to analytical frameworks that 
could be employed for the analysis of impacts. 
 In order to establish the development of the quota distribution within and between national fleet 
segments and the social impact of this quota distribution it is recommended to: 
a) In the profile documents, to be drawn up every 3 years, include a specific section on 
quota allocation, distribution, uptake and allocation criteria 
                                                 
3 Recommendation by ICCAT establishing a multi-annual management plan for Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean Sea https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2018-02-e.pdf 
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b)  In the annual Social Indicators Report include a specific section on this issue, and 
provide annually quantitative data on quota distribution and a narrative on any 
developments in the allocation criteria 
c) Noting that interpreting the developments are very context specific it is recommended 
that when drawing up the annual social indicators report a national expert will be made 
available to provide this context. 
d) Quota allocation and quota allocation criteria should be available for the EWG, together 
(e.g. a Gini ratio for Quota allocation especially between LSF and SSF) with the social 
indicators from the DCF and the future national/ community profiles. 
Quota composition data and flexibility to switch from one stock to another is important to qualify 
the impact of quota allocation and quota distribution between SSF and LSF. This information is 
not only from the DCF catch data, but other criteria also affect flexibility that would only be 
covered in community profiles. This would imply the necessity of indicators on reliance of SSF on 
different stocks, in the direction of the indicators from the STECF-EWG on Balance of capacity and 
fishing opportunities. 
Regarding demographic data from the DCF, it is clear from the analysis that it would be needed to 
have it disaggregated by fleet segment in order to assess the impact of quota allocation systems 
on fleets and communities. The actual level in the regulation is not enough (this disaggregation 
level is only considered voluntary). 
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6 IMPROVEMENT IN SOCIAL DATA GATHERING FOR THE NEXT DATA CALL 2021 (TOR 4) 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The group agrees that there is a real need for social indicators to assess fisheries from a social 
perspective. It would be preferable to be asking what we want to see and not trying to 
retrospectively assess what can be done with the data that is already collected under EU MAP. 
However, we must be pragmatic and recognize that change will not happen overnight. There are 
assessments that can be achieved with the data that are already collected and the aim is to build 
on these datasets and simultaneously try to improve them. We need to be clear in what we can 
deliver now and what we plan to attain in the future. Along with the demographic data that is 
collected we must look towards other social data and the ‘soft information’ surrounding fishing 
communities which while hard to capture and in a quantitative way are still important to 
understand and describe fishing communities. 
 
6.2 Refinement of Existing Variables 
Rationale 
During 2021, MS are obliged to collect social variables for 2020, which means that the data will 
be officially reported under the Fleet-economic data call in 2021. Since many MS have already 
planned or in the process of planning their activities for 2021 it is clear that only short-term 
amendments to variables can be considered during the EWG 20-14.  
The focus of this ToR was to assess the recommendations and conclusions from the reports from 
PGECON 2018 and 2019, the PGECON Workshop on Social variables (2019) in conjunction with 
the recommendations and findings from the STECF 19-03 report ‘Social data in the EU fisheries 
sector’. 
 
6.2.1 Unpaid Labour  
EWG 19-03 felt that although many single operator vessels may feature significant levels of 
unpaid labour for some MS their automatic classification as unpaid labour was an artificial by 
product of an economic approach which needed to account for investment levels, profits etc. 
Additionally, it makes it difficult to calculate the proportion of women in unpaid labour as it 
inflates the number of men. The social group felt that specific questions on the extent of unpaid 
labour by family members or others both onboard the vessel and ashore should be included in 
surveys. 
Rationale 
The family's dependence on fishing activity concerns mainly family fishing enterprises and more 
particularly SSF where the participation of the family is essential for the survival of the enterprise. 
Family participation does not always give rise to remuneration. The main help comes from 
spouses/partners who perform tasks according to the needs of the company. Women's 
contribution ranges from repairing fishing nets, bait longlines, to administrative work, direct sales 
of fish, small processing activities and if it is needed seasonal or occasional participation in fish 
harvesting on board.  
In countries where the Council Directive 86/613/EEC replaced by the directive 2010/41/EU are 
implemented Member states can directly report on the number of women who benefit of the 
assisting/collaborative status. In other MS where such status is not yet implemented other means 
should be used to access this information.  
There was an in-depth discussion on the definitions and data reporting on unpaid labour. The 
EWG is aware and cognisant of the work that has been done in this area by PGECON. However, 
there needs to be more clarity around the definitions of unpaid labour variables to make them 
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consistent and clear to MS so that a harmonized approach can be used in data collection and 
reporting.  
In the EU MAP Guidance document, the following details are given for the unpaid labour 
variables: 
● Value of unpaid labour 
Definition: Imputed value of unpaid labour. Unpaid labour = Work that produces goods or 
services but is unremunerated (OECD Glossary of statistical terms). People working only 
on shore should be included only if their work is directly related to fishing activity. 
PGECON Advice: The estimation of the imputed value of unpaid labour was discussed 
during the WS on calculating capital value using PIM and definition of DCF variables 
(Napoli, 13 -17 June 2011). Taking into account difficulties encountered by MS in 
estimating this variable (recognized by SGECA 10-03 and STECF EWG 11-03), a specific 
ToR was added to clarify definitions and best practices for MS. The group agreed that the 
variable “imputed value of unpaid labour” should include the labour costs of all persons 
delivering unpaid labour both during pre-harvesting, harvesting and post-harvesting 
activities. On the basis of the results of this workshop and comparing different experiences 
by MS (as reported in NPs and ARs), it was suggested that the Value of unpaid labour can 
be estimated using the FTE method (method no.2). 
● Unpaid Labour (Number) 
Definition: Number of engaged crew that have not received compensation in the form of 
wages, salaries, fees, gratuities, piecework pay or remuneration in kind. 
 
EWG 20-14 concluded that these definitions are not comparable. Unpaid labour value includes all 
persons delivering unpaid labour while the definition for total unpaid number only refers to 
engaged crew, which is mostly referring to activities happening onboard the vessel. These 
definitions should be harmonised and wording to the effect that this should refer to the total 
number, or value, of ‘individuals, crew and/or family members engaged in an unpaid capacity’ or 
word to that effect.  
Additionally, in the new EU MAP data call the number of unpaid labour was requested separate to 
the total engaged crew. PGECON had advised to change the term 'Engaged crew' to ‘Paid Labour’ 
(and update definition to exclude unpaid labour). This needs to be discussed and agreed so all MS 
are using the same definition and in case there is a consensus about the change in the variable, 
all MS might need to resubmit the variable for previous years, excluding the number of unpaid 
labour.  
Recommendations 
● Review and amend the definitions of unpaid labour numbers and value of unpaid labour. 
● Update definition of ‘Engaged Crew’ on EU MAP Guidance document and remind MS of the 
definition of ‘engaged crew’ which should not include unpaid labour and revisit changing 
the term to ‘Paid Labour’.  
● Reminder that unpaid labour should include unpaid labour at shore including pre-
harvesting preparations and post-harvesting activities (directly related to fishing 
operations).  
● Recommend the addition of a new indicator which will combine transversal data from the 
fleet economic data call and social data. A measure of unpaid labour as a ratio to effort 
would be useful to assess how much unpaid labour occurs by fishing activity, fishing 
segment or comparisons by MS. An assumption would be that SSF have a higher level of 
unpaid level per effort.  
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● Recommend a future discussion on if there is a need to see the unpaid labour broken down 
by work done at sea or onshore and by gender.  
● Indicator: Number of women having the assisting/collaborative status by fleet (SSF, LSF, 
DWF). 
 
6.2.2 Gender 
Rationale  
There is a significant issue with the visibility of the roles of women in European fisheries industry 
data. This is based on the fact that European fisheries policies and research, until recently, 
focused mainly on resource management, vessel modernization and the market. Moreover, 
women who are not actively engaged on board fishing vessels were less visible because they 
were not officially associated and included in the statistics related to fishing vessel operations, 
which are normatively considered as fishing activities. Moreover, the activity occurring near the 
shore including shellfish and seaweed gathering does not form part of DCF. The same applies for 
land-based work related to the fisheries value chain including selling fish, mending nets and 
baiting longlines. Many assisting spouses are also involved in the administrative part of the 
fishing enterprise, which are not always recognized in the data collection. Further data blind spots 
happen with regards to the diversification of activities conducted by women in fisheries such as 
fishing tourism, or other income-supporting activities which women conduct as part of the family 
enterprise.  
An important tool that could be used to widen the angle of how gender and the value chain could 
be better recognized is the FAO Voluntary Guidelines for SSF, as it opens up on the fisheries 
value chain in terms of pre-harvesting and post-harvesting activities. Recognizing these activities 
as part of the national statistics could engender better visibility of women, as well as provide the 
actual facts of how the fishing fleet operates. With the European Council Directive 86/613/EEC 
replaced by the directive 2010/41/EU), the recognition of assisting spouses or partners’ 
contribution has gained legal protection, especially for those whose role is not remunerated. It 
offers women some social benefits such as a retired pension, maternity leave, vocational training 
and the possibility to be part of male fishing organisations if the husband/ partners doesn’t want 
to use his right. 
Recommendations 
For this reason, we are suggesting the following indicators for gender  
1. Paid employment in harvesting disaggregated by gender  
2. The number of women operating on board of fishing vessels as active skippers or crew. 
3. In order to understand which groups of women are included in the number given by 
Member States we should clarify which roles they carry out:  
- Women owners of vessels operating on board as skipper:  
- Women owners or co-owners of vessels without any activity on board, 
- Women acting as crew members. 
 
6.2.3 Education 
Rationale 
It is important to conduct studies on the educational level, vocational training and lifelong 
learning opportunities, for all crew members from vessel owners, skippers and crew members. 
These elements would be necessary to understand potential implications that could be 
encountered in the implementation of new fisheries management measures. This would also 
identify the risk that might impact the recruitment of young fishers due to specific qualification 
requirements. It is therefore important to identify, in advance, the gaps or needs of this 
population, both in terms of education and vocational training. The aim is to enable this 
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population of fishers to enter the labour market or to create other related or non-related activities 
to the fisheries sector. Access to training therefore does not only concern the practice of fishing 
professions, but also activities beyond fisheries, including reskilling and upskilling. 
 
Background 
PGECON advised to collect and report data on education in four categories (Low, Medium, High, 
unknown). EWG 19-03 recommended that another category be added to this aggregation as 
‘responses to the education question [in the data call] point towards a necessity to have a clearer 
understanding of the level and role of fisheries technical qualification’. Therefore, a new question 
could be included on this topic following additional discussions to agree on some common 
categories. 
Recommendation 
The EWG considered the need to add more categories to the level of education reporting. The 
questions and level of reporting for education level should remain and the group suggests that an 
additional variable is added to capture vocational training.  
 
6.2.4 Employment Status 
Rationale 
The EWG 19-04 felt that there was considerable scope to refine and add value to this variable. 
The PGECON WS recommends at least separation between the following two categories: 
• owner / employer (vessel owner involved in vessel activity/operation), and  
• employee (all engaged workers on-board, excluding owners) 
The EUROSTAT Labour Force Survey uses the following categories: 
● Self-employed with employees 
● Self-employed without employees 
● Employee 
● Family worker. 
As detailed in EWG 19-03 the difficulty with both the PGECON and Eurostat categorisations is that 
they don’t account for all of the most common categories of employment status found in fisheries 
and does not allow for meaningful analysis. This EWG recognised that the 
An alternative categorisation could be: 
● Vessel owner and skipper 
● Vessel owner (not fishing) 
● Unpaid Vessel Owner/Skippers (Croatian Case) 
● Share fisher skipper 
● Share fisher crew 
● Employee under Fixed Contract with vessel 
● Employee under Fixed Contract with agency 
● Family member providing unpaid labour aboard vessel 
● Family member providing unpaid labour ashore 
● Community member (any other persons not family) providing unpaid labour aboard vessel 
● Community member (any other persons not family) providing unpaid labour ashore  
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Part of the improvement of our social understanding of the EU fleet, is to have a better 
understanding of employment status as an aspect of the structure of the EU labor force. 
Employment status of fishers will inform us on the breakdown of ‘share-fishers’ and ‘self-
employed’ fishers. It would be useful to improve this indicator further by looking at the following 
aspects: 
Payment structures differ by MSs with some considering share fishermen as self-employed and 
others not. This needs to be considered. For example crew share in Dutch fishers fish in a 
partnership agreement. That means that instead of having a fixed salary they share in the profit 
and the risk (no or low catch) of fishing. They work under contracts ‘Partnership agreement for 
share fishermen’ and are linked to the Social Fund for the Share-Fishery. Depending on the role 
of the crew-member, the share of the catch will be different: 
 captain 
 chief mate 
 engineer 
 second mate 
 sailor 
 trainee 
Also the experience of the fisher can differ, resulting in a larger share when a fisher has more 
experience. Generally crew get 42% of the grossing minus costs. With six men on the vessel, 
each get 7% of the remaining revenue. In an example of €40,000 grossing – €17,500 costs = 
€22,500 remaining revenue. Each crew member gets €1,575 Euro for a week (minus €100 Euro 
for the social fund = €1,475). The fishers still have to pay taxes (and save for their pension). 
Other fishers, common in many MS, is the situation where you have employed crew, i.e. some 
fishers (crew) are not working in a partnership agreement but work as employees with a fixed 
salary. 
In the Dutch fisheries the pelagic fishers work as employees and have negotiated a collective 
labour agreement. The fishers get a share of the catch, but there is a basic salary (guarantee). 
They receive a net salary (pension and tax are subtracted before). 
In Belgium it is likely that the vast majority of fishers will be registered as ‘employee’. In 2003, a 
law on employment ended the “No catch, no pay” era, assuring income security for each trip 
through a set minimum wage per day at sea. This is unique in Europe. Compared to other 
member states, Belgian fishers have a relatively high income as they receive a fixed percentage 
of the gross value of landings that is usually much higher than the guaranteed minimum wage. 
So, a larger catch usually leads to a higher income. 
In the light of the above consideration, explore the link between self-employment and unpaid, 
e.g. is work of the vessel owner (hence self-employed) unpaid work? Need to align with 
international standards, as the ESA account system definition where it is set that “Self-employed 
persons are defined as persons who are the sole owners, or joint owners, of the unincorporated 
enterprises in which they work, excluding those unincorporated enterprises that are classified as 
quasi-corporations. Self-employed persons are classified here if they are not also in a paid 
employment which constitutes their principal activity: in that latter case they are classified under 
employees. Self-employed persons also include the following categories: unpaid family workers, 
outworkers and workers engaged in production undertaken entirely for their own final 
consumption or own capital formation, either individually or collectively. 
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6.2.5 Nationality  
Data regarding nationality particularly in relation to Non-EU/EEA crew members employed in the 
SSF and LSF is important to collect as it is showing the difficulties experienced in recruiting 
national or EU crew in some fleet (example purse seiners, see 19-03). Another good example is 
the Distant Water Fleet (DWF), that employs the largest number (31%) of Non EU/ EEA workers. 
The DWF fleet is employing the highest number of Non-EU/ EEA employment and it could be 
interesting to see which geographical areas these vessels are operating. This link should be easy 
to calculate from the AER data. The geographical detail of these data is also very relevant to 
analyse the trends in outermost regions. 
It is also important to analyse the geographical areas these vessels are operating in. The 
geographical detail of these data is relevant in order to analyse the trends in outermost regions. 
Recommendation 
The data relating to nationality and the presence of Non-EU/EEA indicates that further research 
may be needed to understand the dynamic of these fleets and to help explain the reasons and 
predict future trends. Recommend that MS try to provide more detailed data and provide 
complementary information to allow an understanding of the data.  
 
6.2.6 Age Distribution  
Rationale 
The age of fishers (men and women) whether they are the owners or crew is an important 
indicator particularly in case of EU implementation of fisheries management, such as recovery 
plans or other restrictive measures linked to the availability of resources. This indicator can guide 
the deployment of special social policies and actions to undertake according to the age of each 
fisher impacted by these measures to enhance their resilience. Such measures may include early 
retirement, and or training to find other jobs. By having quantitative data of the age of fishers, it 
will be easier to identify the needs across the generations. Young people can be re-orientated to 
other maritime activities (through vocational training) and early retirement plans can be offered 
to elderly fishers. Moreover, the age is an important indicator that provides a forecast of the 
average age of the fisher population and indicates potential trajectories for the Member States to 
recuperate ageing populations. This could be linked to promotion of the fishing job to younger 
generations, such as young fisher schemes.  
On the other hand, the average age of fishers (men and women) is an indicator of the 
attractiveness of the sector. In the case of a majority of old fishers then states should promote 
the job to the young generation (see Figure 6.1).  
 
Figure 6.1: Age distribution for SCF and LSF for 2017 (EWG 19-03) 
Background 
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Recommendation 5 from the PGECON WS on Social Variables was that ‘The group recommended 
to report age by the following age groups: <15, 15-24, 25-39, 40-64. >64, Unknown, and 
[blank].’ Following this recommendation, MS collected and reported the data in the requested age 
categories: <=14, 15-24, 25-39, 40-64, >=65 and unknown.  
EWG 19-03 noted that the 40-64 age class made up the largest proportion (58%) and agreed 
that further disaggregation of this age class is needed. PGECON 2019 agreed that the age class 
chosen are useless to identify social phenomena like social mobility or ageing and that smaller 
classes (10 year) are needed.  
Recommendation  
EWG 20-14 proposes the following scenarios for the disaggregation of the age classes to be 
discussed in future PGECON meetings.  
1. <=14, 15-24, 25-32, 33-39, 40-49, 50-57, 58-64, >=65 and unknown. 
Pros: The data collected in 2020 and 2023 will be comparable with the 2017. 
The data will be comparable with the data collected by EUROSTAT.  
2. <=14, 15-24, 25-39, 40-49, 50-57, 58-64, >=65 and unknown. 
Pros: The data collected in 2020 and 2023 will be comparable with the 2017. 
The recommendation from STECF 19-03 will be followed. 
The data will be comparable with the data collected by EUROSTAT.  
Cons: The years going into each age class will be different: 15-24 -10; 25-39 -15; 40-49 -
10; 50-57 -8; 58-64 -7; 
The age class 25-39 is still very big. 
3. <=14, 15-24, 25-32, 33-39; 40-49, 50-57, 58-64, >=65 and unknown. 
Pros: The data collected in 2020 and 2023 will be comparable with the 2017. 
The data will be comparable with the data collected by EUROSTAT.  
Cons: The years going into each age class will be different: 15-24 -10; 25-31 -7; 32-39 -
8; 40-49 -10; 50-57 -8; 58-64 -7; 
4. <=14, 15-24, 25-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-64, >=65 and unknown. 
Pros: The recommendation from 2019 PGECON will be followed. 
The data will be comparable with the data collected by EUROSTAT.  
Cons: The data collected in 2020 and 2023 will be partly comparable with the 2017. 
5. <=14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, >=65 and unknown 
Pros: The recommendation from 2019 PGECON will be followed. 
Cons: The data collected in 2020 and 2023 will be partly comparable with the 2017. 
The data will NOT be comparable with the data collected by EUROSTAT.  
6. <=14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64 >=65 and 
unknown 
Pros: Detailed analysis about the age structure of the fishers can be done. 
The data will be comparable with the data collected by EUROSTAT.  
Cons: The data collected in 2020 and 2023 will NOT be comparable with the 2017. 
The disaggregation of the age classes at such a low level might lead to administrative problems in 
the countries in which the social variables are under the regular data collection of economic 
variables. It might be a problem to collect so disaggregated data for the aquaculture and the 
processing industry.  
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION BEFORE 
REVIEW BY THE STECF 
 
70 
 The age classes used by EUROSTAT are: 0-14, 15-24, 25-49, 50-64, 65-79, 80 and more. 
However, for other MS, who collect data at a fine resolution, aggregating age data into categories 
is not an onerous task.  
 
6.2.7 Combination of social and economic data/indicators/ 
EWG 19-03 discussed possibilities of maximising the utility of the variables already collected by 
combining them together and with economic variable data also to create indices. Initial 
candidates discussed were: 
● An Aging index. This would be simply done by expressing the age profile as the number of 
fishers over 65 divided by the number under 40 ( >𝟔𝟓 <𝟒𝟎 ). Higher values would indicate 
greater aging issues within the population.  
● Some social indicators could also be easily combined with economic indicators like: i) 
profit, ii) income, iii) total costs, iv) profit margin, v) imputed value of unpaid labour etc. 
In this way, it could be interesting to compare some pure economic indicators in groups 
that are formed by social variables e.g. by grouping vessels using the aging index of the 
crew: e.g. vessels with >0.5 and vessels with <0.5. One added suggestion from EWG 20-
14 is the use of effort with unpaid labour to produce an unpaid labour per unit effort.  
● In the same way, we could apply indices that can be extracted using other social variables 
like education level, employment status etc. 
A problem that might be foreseen is that the economic data is reported at segment level, while 
the social data is collected at fishing activity level (SSF, LSF, DWF). However, there are a number 
of variables from the economic data call that might, on their own, or in combination with other 
variables, provide more insight and the economic data can be presented in the fishing activity 
levels. 
 
6.2.8 Question of New Variables 
We might want to expand on these, with rationales, just some of the ideas we came up with. This 
text can maybe be used in conjunction with ToR 5.  
There are also further levels of refinement which could be sought here although it is likely that 
these may only be practically available for pilot studies due to the workload involved. Again, 
these require further discussion. Some areas that need to be discussed by the Social Variables 
PGECON Sub-Group may include: 
 
6.2.9 Retirement age and Pensions 
A qualitative description should be recommended. When the fishers retire where do they get a 
pension from? MS have different systems in some MS the fishermen are paying their social taxes 
in special funds for people working at sea, while in the other countries the pensions and the taxes 
paid by the employees are going in the same fund there may be state pensions, funds for 
unemployed people, special fishery funds for retirement, social systems and private pensions. 
There are also differences in how women access retirement. In Italy women can register as 
fishers/vessel owners to get pension but they may not fish. In France they can say that they are 
self-employed and they can pay into a specific pension scheme for retirement. 
 
6.2.10  Payment structures (wage, share)  
In line with the conclusions of EWG 19-03, the categories for employment should be extended to 
include the category ‘share fishers’. Due to the importance of the share fishing arrangement and 
the fact that it is fundamentally different to the Eurostat categories it is considered important to 
collect data on this. Also trends or changes to the ratios of share fishers to contract fishers would 
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be very important as they may indicate deeper social changes. An alternative categorisation for 
this variable is described in full in the report. 
 
6.2.11 Vessel ownership (family businesses, companies, external MS ownership) 
Ownership of fishing fleets needs to be further investigated such that more information on who 
owns what and how this is reflected through the data. This would help shed more light on what is 
happening with regards to accumulation of fishing vessels by different owners, in spite of non-
transferability in some cases. Ownership of fishing vessels as well as of fishing rights is an 
important component that needs to be better assessed in terms of ownership of GT and KW, 
number of vessels, as well as ownership of quota, and or ITQs. The ownership also plays an 
important role in determining access principles, as many are able to enter the market due to a 
capital investment, while those from the younger generation are outcompeted due to high price 
tags attached to the fishing rights.  
Relevance of shared-ownership. Based on the provisions of a note in Appendix VI of Commission 
Decision 2010/93 / EU "shared ownership (involving more than one person) should be regarded 
as one unit". 
In some countries (e.g. Italy) shared ownership or co-ownership is common in the small-scale 
fisheries among spouses or relatives: it is a practice that responds to the need for greater 
distribution of income for individuals belonging to the same family (source: direct interviews with 
fishermen under the survey for social data collection). 
 
6.2.12  New entrants to the industry (vessels and new crew). 
If our fishing population is ageing, then there may be a situation of intergenerational deficit which 
could be a threat to its sustainability. It is hard to decipher from registers if new vessels added to 
the register are ‘new entrants’ or just renewed investments from established fishermen. This is a 
complicated case and more research is needed to decide how these data could be captured. 
Community Profiles (as discussed in TOR 5) could help in identifying ownership criteria that could 
be further studied. 
 
6.2.13  Number of Enterprises 
The group noticed the lack of available information on how the variable “Number of enterprises” 
is calculated in each country. During the discussion different cases were mentioned and new 
questions were raised, which might be investigated during a workshop under PGECON or another 
relevant group.  
The suggested topics that needs further discussion include: 
• Is foreign ownership allowed in the country? 
• In case the foreign ownership is allowed, are there any restrictions /EU national and 3rd 
countries? 
• Is there available information on how many vessels are owned by parent companies? 
• Comparison between the licensing systems in each MS. 
• Ratio between the vessels owned by family companies and all the vessels.  
• Is it possible one person can be registered as owner of a vessel A on one hand and as 
owner of a legal entity owning vessel B on the other hand? 
• Are there restrictions on the total allowed quota that might be allocated to one company?  
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6.2.14  Other Income  
Under the current EU MAP ‘Other Income’ is described as ‘Totals invoiced during the reference 
period, corresponding to vessel activities other than fishing supplied to third parties. Insurance 
payment for damage/loss of gear/vessel should be included’. The EWG considered if collected 
other income not related to vessel activities would be useful to describe the dependency of 
families and business on other incomes streams outside of vessel operations.  
 
6.2.15  Data Definitions 
● When looking at fishing communities we are missing out on seafood gatherers due to the 
definition of ‘fishing’ which excludes operations not on vessels. This skews the data especially 
when looking at gender statistics. 
● The definition of SSF needs to be addressed, the definition with introduced gear usage 
excludes many small vessels from the SSF data sets.  
 
6.2.16  PGECON, EWGs Mechanism for Change 
The experts in EWG 20-14 were unanimous that the continuation of the work done so far by 
expert groups is essential for the improvement of the data collected and the harmonization of the 
methodologies in the different MS. This can be continued through the social variable data 
subgroup under PGECON or in another appropriate form (if this is more appropriate). This group 
should include social scientists, economists and data collectors. This group should meet every 
year, despite the fact that the next social data collection of social variables is planned for 2021 
(covering the data from 2020) and will be officially reported in 2022.  
The changes in the list of variables that may be collected in future should be decided after their 
purpose is clear. The optimal way is if all the proposed variables go through PGECON subgroups, 
or another designated group, and if it is clearly communicated to the MS as to why these data are 
important and how it should be collected. No room for interpretations should be left. 
Possible terms of reference for the social variable group could include: 
● Further development of the methodologies for the collection and interpretation of the 
current mandatory variables that are collected under DCF.  
● Homogenization of the data reporting methodologies for all variables at MS level, if 
applicable.  
● Review of the new indicators proposed by different working groups and writing definitions 
for the ones relevant for future data collection.  
● Proposals how each of the new variables can be collected not only by the countries that 
have special social researches, but also the ones that are including the social data 
collection in their annual economic data collection.  
● Description of self-employee in each country; 
● Availability of data in each MS.  
Over the last couple of years PGECON allocated a lot of effort assisting the development of 
definitions for the social indicators of the EU MAP. The SECFISH project used the same list of 
agreed definitions when analysing EU MAP variables and proposed a technique of how to estimate 
from the sample to the population for social indicators, however more guidance and coordination 
might be needed in the future based on the results of the first data submission. Any future 
meeting should also pay attention to the final SecFish work package on social data. This work 
focused on social data—end users, possible applications data use and linking societal indicators 
available from other data sources (e.g. EUROSTAT) with the fisheries, aquaculture and processing 
sectors. The research also included investigating relevant international data sources (e.g., 
EUROSTAT, OECD, FAO) to identify available data and useful variables with the end-goal of 
evaluating the feasibility of extracting data already available from these international data 
sources.  
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6.2.17  Conclusions  
In conclusion the EWG agreed that we need to be pragmatic in relation to what we can achieve in 
the short term and instead plan for the future of social data collection and analysis. 
The group considered and commented on the recommendations from EWG 19-03 and expanded 
on possible areas to discuss. The result of this is that there are two avenues that need to be 
addressed. The first are variables that need to be clarified before MS begins to collect and report 
the next set of social variables. Specifically, this relates to age categories, unpaid labour and 
gender (in relation to unpaid labour).  
The group recommends that discussions of new variables or significant changes to existing 
variable definitions need to be discussed and agreed at the social variable sub-group of PGECON 
or another suitable group. This group must consist of social scientists as well as the data 
collectors and/or end users as PGECON has consistently commented that the required expertise 
does not exist in their group to deal with these issues.  
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7 POSSIBILITIES AND METHODOLOGIES FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY PROFILES (TOR 5) 
 
  “STECF plenary 19-02 in reviewing EWG 19-03 concluded that in order to 
be able to properly analyse and interpret social data collected the data should be put in 
context through the provision of national and/or local fisheries sector profiles. The EWG 
should propose methodologies for the expansion of the social analysis to include a) national 
profiles which may include information on fisheries and quota management regimes, 
employment status of fishers, summaries of existing community profiles etc. and b) specific 
fishing community social profiles where possible.” 
This TOR arose from a finding during EWG 19-03 that it was difficult to interpret some of the data 
without having at least a national level context within which to place it. The TOR is split into 2 
distinct sections: the first deals with the compiling of national profiles which could provide a 
national level overview of some fundamental aspects of the fishing industry; the second section 
deals with the more detailed process of creating community profiles, where a detailed picture of 
the local social and economic impacts of policy making would be built up. 
 
7.1 Draft Template for a national fisheries sector profile 
The National Fisheries Sector Profile provides a brief outline of the structure, economics, social 
and cultural role of fisheries in the addressed MS society. It contextualises fisheries using already 
existing quantitative data and further qualitative information from MS fisheries’ experts. Base 
data about the economics, the living and working in a MS are combined with the description of 
social (and economic) data from fisheries. In doing so, National Fisheries Sector Profiles are the 
starting point to use the potentials of social data, where the real value often only revealed in a 
relevant comparison (STECF-19-03, p.205). An evaluation of fishers’ age, gender, education and 
income can only be expedient considering the overall national’s performance or even further in 
comparison with a related sector (e.g. agriculture) (STECF-19-03, p.193). Such comparisons of 
social variables enable scientists to identify imbalances in society and point out the political 
question of well-being and living conditions.  
Moreover and due to the fact, that the attendance at EWG is limited and not every MS is 
presented by a national expert, National Fisheries Sector Profiles provide essential background 
information to experts, who are asked to write a national chapter about a MS, of which they do 
not have the specialist knowledge (STECF-19-03, p.204). 
The EWG propose that to some extent National Fisheries Sector Profiles lay down the core 
structure of future STECF reports on social variables in fisheries (and possibly at the same time 
for aquaculture). The analysing of social variables should not be given as additional work to 
already existing EWGs, which work on the Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (AER) 
or biannually on EU aquaculture. Further, the AER experts, which are mainly economists and 
other data experts mind have a gap of knowledge regarding the handling and interpretation of 
social variables. In consequence, EWG recommends to build up National Fisheries Sector Profiles 
against the background of a next STECF EWG meeting on social data in the EU fisheries sector in 
line with the data call (expectedly 2022).  
The following section presents a manual on how to write a National Fisheries Profile. The manual 
includes a minimum, obligatory standard of data, which have to be given in the profile and 
impulses of how to extend the profile with further valuable, but voluntary information.  
TABLE 7.1 below provides a comprehensive list of descriptors, which should be utilised for the 
National Fisheries Sector Profile. The large majority of the requested information is easily 
available at online sources such as Eurostat, DCF, Eurofound. 
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Table 7.1: Proposed table of contents, descriptors and sources for drafting national fisheries sector profile  
SECTION SUBSECTION DESCRIPTION OF MAIN CONTENT 
MAIN DESCRIPTORS NEEDED 
(INDICATORS) AND TYPE OF 
VISUALISATION 
MAIN SOURCES FOR 
INDICATORS 
IS THE CONTENT OF THE ANALYSIS AVAILABLE 
IN OTHER REPORTS? IF YES, WHERE? 
1. Overview Overview Factsheets 
Main indicators included under sub-
section (look at the example in the 
text) 
Eurostat  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/data
base 
No analysis needed here. Only factsheet. 
DCF 
https://stecf.jrc.ec.
europa.eu/dd/fleet 
FAO 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/ITA/en 
2. Description 
of the national 
fishery sector 
(present time) 
General description of the 
National society 
Role of the Fishery sector on the overall National 
economy? How the fishery sector contributes to the 
national economy? 
Total employment  Eurostat  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/data
base 
Country profile on the EU website 
(https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/countries_en)  
National chapter under the Annual Economic Report for 
the EU Fleet 
(https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic) 
Fishery country profile 
(http://www.fao.org/fishery/countryprofiles/search/en) 
Blue Economy Report 
(https://blueindicators.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20
19_blue_economy_report_5.pdf) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
Gross Value Added (GVA) in the 
fishery sector 
DCF 
https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/dd/fleet Employment in the fishery sector 
% of employment/VA of fishery on the 
Blue Economy sector 
Main fisheries categories  (e.g., industrial for meal, pelagic, demersal) 
Turnover and employment of the 
main fisheries sectors  
DCF 
EUMOFA (https://www.eumofa.eu/data) 
National chapter under the STECF Annual Economic 
Report for the EU Fleet 
(https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic) 
EUMOFA Country profiles (https://www.eumofa.eu/the-
eu-market#countryProfiles) 
EUMOFA EU fish market analysis 
(https://www.eumofa.eu/it/market-analysis) 
Geographic areas  
(areas at sea fished; # of ports and main landing 
ports) 
Lenght of coastline, number of ports, 
areas fished  
Community Fleet Register 
(https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fleet-
europa/search_en) 
Emodnet database 
(https://emodnet.eu/en) 
European Atlas of the Seas 
(https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/at
las) 
Marine Regions 
(https://www.marineregions.org/about.p
hp) 
Fishery country profile 
(http://www.fao.org/fishery/countryprofiles/search/en) 
Fleet descriptions  (LSF, SSF, pelagic, etc) 
By fleet: number of vessels, landings 
of main species, employment and 
turnover 
DCF: 
https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/dd/fleet 
National chapter under the STECF Annual Economic 
Report for the EU Fleet 
(https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic) 
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SECTION SUBSECTION DESCRIPTION OF MAIN CONTENT 
MAIN DESCRIPTORS NEEDED 
(INDICATORS) AND TYPE OF 
VISUALISATION 
MAIN SOURCES FOR 
INDICATORS 
IS THE CONTENT OF THE ANALYSIS AVAILABLE 
IN OTHER REPORTS? IF YES, WHERE? 
Market and trade 
Provide quantitative information on, e.g. per capita 
fish consumption; importance of export/processing); 
others (e.g., gear developments such as the Trawl 
centre in Northern DK). 
Fish per capita consumption 
Import-export 
Self-sufficiency indicators 
(dependency from import) 
Turnover of fish processing 
Value chain 
EUROSTAT 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/data
base 
EUMOFA https://www.eumofa.eu/data 
DCF 
https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/dd/proind 
National chapter under the STECF Fish processing report 
EUMOFA Country profiles (https://www.eumofa.eu/the-
eu-market#countryProfiles) 
EUMOFA EU fish market analysis 
(https://www.eumofa.eu/it/market-analysis 
Management & Governance  
(e.g., responsible national authorities, PO-or lack 
thereof- for fleet sectors, Regional Fishery body 
membership, etc.) 
Different level of management, 
Regional fishery Bodies' membership, 
Number of POs, FLAGs 
Emodnet database 
(https://emodnet.eu/en) 
European Atlas of the Seas 
(https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/at
las) 
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/mark
et/producer_organisations_en 
National chapter under the Annual Economic Report for 
the EU Fleet 
(https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic) 
3. FOCUS on 
social and 
economic 
aspects of 
Fisheries 
Context - Fisheries in the 
national societal context 
Provide qualitative description of the societal/cultural 
history in fisheries (including fisheries related events 
such as festivals, fisheries/coastal community 
tourism); micro-cultural groupings; demographics.  
Provide qualitative information on the importance of 
fisheries as source of income for households 
Provide qualitative information on the role of 
fisheries in relation to other sectors (e.g. dependance 
from tourism/Ho.Re.Ca. sector) 
Persons/households living on income 
from fisheries, Fish consumption 
outside home, Importance of Seafood 
restaurants, Festival/events linked to 
the fishery sector 
    
Employment and labour 
aspects 
Provide quantitative data on the breakdown by age, 
nationality, gender of employment in fisheries; 
including unpaid labour and shore crew. 
Provide qualitative data on the remuneration 
scheme, if different for the fisheries' sectors 
Socio-demographics for the fishery 
sectors 
DCF Social data collection 
STECF reports on the Social indicators of EU fleet 
(https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic) 
Social Security systems 
Provide qualitative data on the fishery's retirement 
scheme vs. national economy's one, working 
conditions, accident at sea, occupational diseases  
Pensionable age, real retirement age, 
accident at sea, health diseases in the 
fishery sector 
https://www.missoc.org/missoc-
database/comparative-tables/ 
Country profile 
(https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/country) 
 
Education and Training 
Educational level of fishermen, Accessibility to 
vocational training 
Employment in fisheries by 
educational attainment 
DCF Social data collection 
STECF reports on the Social indicators of EU fleet 
(https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic) 
Institutional and legal 
elements; 
Representativeness  
Provide qualitative information on fishery 
representativeness: are fishermen really represent 
on stakeholders' consultation?  
Number of trade unions and employer 
organisations in the fishery sector 
  
Representativeness of the European social partner 
organisations: Sea fisheries sector 
(https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_p
ublication/field_ef_document/ef20010en.pdf)  
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SECTION SUBSECTION DESCRIPTION OF MAIN CONTENT 
MAIN DESCRIPTORS NEEDED 
(INDICATORS) AND TYPE OF 
VISUALISATION 
MAIN SOURCES FOR 
INDICATORS 
IS THE CONTENT OF THE ANALYSIS AVAILABLE 
IN OTHER REPORTS? IF YES, WHERE? 
Access to fisheries  
Is fishery open access? Which type of restrictions are 
in place? Is the fishery rights-based managed? Is the 
allocation of rights fair enough? 
TACs, quota, allocation criteria 
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishin
g_rules/tacs_en 
Fisheries overviews by regions 
(https://www.ices.dk/advice/advisory-
process/Pages/fisheries-overviews.aspx) 
National chapter under the Annual Economic Report for 
the EU Fleet 
(https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic) 
Who gets to fish? The allocation of fishing opportunities in 
EU Member States 
(https://neweconomics.org/uploads/files/Carpenter-
Kleinjans-Who-gets-to-fish-16.03.pdf) 
4.Trends, 
Issues and 
Development 
Summary of the overall 
trends in the fisheries  
Provide a description of, e.g. trends in landing 
sites/ports development, certification, technological 
developments, etc… 
      
Constraints  
Provide a description of, e.g., sector restructuring, 
quota allocation, loss of support industries, conflicts 
at sea (within fisheries and without); COVID-19, etc. 
Including societal trends having an impact on 
fisheries (e.g. gentrification on-land, people living 
outside  
      
Opportunities  
Provide a description of, e.g., related industry such 
as processing, seaweeds; maritime-based tourism; 
governmental policies 
      
5. References References 
Provide references for quantitative data used but not 
publicly available 
Provide references for the qualitative information 
provided 
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7.2 Manual on National Fisheries Sector Profile 
The national fisheries profile briefly describes the fisheries sector of a MS. It provides general 
demographic, social, cultural and economic information. The profile contextualises MS fisheries 
and helps to interpret the overall societal situation of one countries fisheries sector.  
Information provided by MS fisheries experts in the sector profile includes two kinds of 
information: i) mandatory and ii) voluntary data. There is a standard of mandatory data for each 
MS profile, which have to be provided from available sources such as Eurostat, DCF or EUMOFA.  
 
Available descriptors (indicators) and sources for the following sections of the national fisheries 
sector profile can be found in Table 7.1. 
Voluntary information goes beyond mandatory data available at Eurostat, DCF or EUMOFA. It 
bases on national expert knowledge and delivers additional background information (also 
qualitative data). 
Although touching many aspects of fisheries the national fisheries sector profile remains an 
overlook and should not extend 5 pages. 
 
National Fisheries Sector Profile  
1. Factsheet 
The factsheet presents an overview about the national’s commercial fisheries sector at a glance, 
which is mainly filled out by information gained from the Annual Economic Report (AER) on the 
EU Fisheries Fleet. 
Germany’s marine Fisheries Sector 2019 (as example) 
Main operating seas NEA, North Sea, Baltic   
Management TAC, quota linked to vessels   
Fleet segments SSCF + LSF + DWF   
Fleet capacity 1 349 vessels 
Fishers  1 654 (crew offshore) 
Production 231 kt 
Value of landings EUR 218 Mill 
Particularities Brown shrimp fishery; SSF part-time 
fishers 
National's seafood 
consumption  
13.9 kg per capita 
 
2. Description of National Fisheries Sector  
This section includes: 
 General description of national society 
 Main fisheries categories 
 Geographic areas 
 Fleet descriptions  
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 Market and trade 
 Management & Governance 
Please, describe here the characteristics of your nation and of fisheries in general. The description 
should focus on the present (historical development can be placed under section 4 “Trends, 
Issues and Development”). The description of the country includes information about geographic 
(e.g. area, coastline), seafood market and society. The later refers to demographic information 
such as population, mean age, gender or education levels; and economic indicators such as mean 
income, nation’s value added (VA), Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Information about the seafood 
market and trade includes trade balances, values (e.g. GVA), and seafood consumption. 
The introduction of the country should be followed by a brief fleet description (e.g. pelagic, 
demersal, fleet segments, gears and techniques), areas of fishing activities, target species, 
management and governance (e.g. TAC, ITQs, closed areas). 
 
3. Social, Cultural and Economic Aspects of Fisheries  
This is the main section of the National Fisheries Sector Profile. The following themes should be 
covered: 
 Fisheries in the national societal context (incl. national economy) 
 Institutional and legal elements (incl. representativeness) 
 Employment and labour aspects 
 Social security systems 
 Education and trainings 
This section takes a deeper look at the fisheries sector’s role in society. It describes the salient 
social, institutional and legal elements for each MS; the access to fishing rights, fishers 
employment (including unpaid labour and the social security system), education, training and 
income situation, questions of ownership (as additional information if available) and describes the 
dependencies of the fisheries from other sectors. Some of the information given should consider 
the nation’s context. Wherever possible, the demographic data of fisheries sector (age, gender, 
employment, income) should be putted in relation with national data or/and with the Blue Growth 
sector or a comparable sector from food industries (e.g. agriculture). Useful questions to ask here 
are: Do fishers receive more or less income than the national average? Are they better or worse 
educated than the rest of the population?  
As much as possible experts should contextualise quantitative data received from DCF with 
qualitative information. E.g. after the education data is described (cf. figures below), additional 
information about how the educational access to become a fisher is regulated (e.g. three year 
apprenticeship) and how the educational systems looks like (e.g. vocational schools) etc. 
Cultural impacts such as events and traditions related to fisheries (e.g. festivals) and societal 
sectors, which are closed linked to fisheries (e.g. processing, tourism, recreational fisheries) 
should be mentioned. 
Figure: Please provide figures for demographic and economic performance of the sector in this 
section (cf. STEFC-19-03 and AERs)  
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4. Trends, Issues and Development 
The last section of the National Fisheries Sector Profile includes: 
 Description of recent history 
 Trends in the industry (e.g. development of ports) 
 Constraints  
 Opportunities 
Section four presents mainly qualitative knowledge about historical developments of fishing 
ports/communities and current trends. It sum ups constraints (e.g. sector restructuring, quota 
allocation, loss of support industries, gentrification on-land and other societal trends with an 
impact towards fisheries), conflicts at sea (within fisheries and without)), crises, challenges, 
opportunities (innovations) of a countries fisheries sector. 
 
7.3 Fishing Community Profiles - Guidance Template 
This section of the report provides guidance on Community profiling for MS who wish to conduct 
them. This guidance attempts to ensure that community profiling initiatives across Europe 
address some common issues and questions without being overly prescriptive. It also hopes to 
identify who will conduct Community profiling activities. It also aims to clarify the role of 
Community Profiling in the cycle of EU social data collection and analysis as an additional element 
(optional but encouraged and incentivised) providing benefits to management decision making 
and social and economic impact assessment. The section outlines a mixed methods approach 
which combines qualitative and quantitative data. We also discuss possible funding models for 
example the US NOAA/Sea Grant Program, and explore the possibility of securing funding 
through the EMFAF. 
 
7.3.1 Objectives of conducting Community profiling 
Community profiles are a key tool for investigating the social and economic conditions of fisheries 
and fishing communities.  
They provide detailed sociocultural, institutional (including governance), and economic data and 
information in qualitative and quantitative forms which can be used for management decision 
making and impact assessments. 
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A time series of community profiles will provide a much more detailed understanding of trends 
and developments within fishing communities than is currently available. 
The rationale and reasoning for putting together a profile must also be understood. Profiles 
provide data which explain the social and economic importance of the fisheries and maritime 
sectors in specific communities. They also explain trends and changes such as, for example, loss 
of access to infrastructure, regulatory changes, social and demographic changes and changes to 
resource abundance. Critically, they also provide information which can uncover cumulative 
impacts.  
Issues or trends such as the concentration of landings in harbours where auctions are held, e.g. 
Dutch vessels landing fish in Boulogne sur Mer, are also usefully revealed in community profiling 
initiatives. The impact of such trends on the subject community, e.g. Boulogne sur Mer, can be 
assessed but secondary impacts on other communities, e.g. the home ports of the Dutch vessels 
can also be better understood. 
Another important justification for conducting community profiles is that they provide much of the 
baseline data needed to meet legal requirements, such as impact assessment. There are EU 
regulations in place which require social and economic issues to be taken into account within 
fisheries management regulations. Three of these regulations include Impact Assessments as do 
CFP regulations 2 and 17: 
• Impact assessments. IAs are required for all new proposed regulations that take social and 
economic (and environmental) issues into account as specified within the European 
Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines (2009) and Toolkit (2015).  
• Article 2 (5) of the 2013 CFP Regulation (1380/2013): requires multi-annual plans to take 
socio-economic aspects into account; and  
• Article 17 (CFP 1380/2013 Regulation): requires the use of transparent and objective 
criteria that including social, environmental and economic criteria when assigning fishing 
possibilities both within general quotas and those allocated within multi-annual plans.  
 
According to the EU these impact assessments should form part of “an integrated approach which 
analyses both benefits and costs, and addresses all significant economic, social and 
environmental impacts of possible new initiatives” 
(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.htm). 
 
7.3.2 What are Community Profiles? 
Profiles are a tool for analysing social processes found in fishing communities and in the fisheries 
sector. They provide details and contexts for necessary for more thorough understandings and 
analyses of the social indicators found in the DCF. They also allow for understanding the various 
linkages among different scales (individual, community, region, MS, Sea Basin and EU levels). 
 
Compiling data for profiles is an intensive process. Comprehensive profiles use a mixed methods 
approach, (see Methodology below) relying on previously compiled data, when available, and 
using empirical data collection to fill in gaps. Though empirical data collection can be time 
intensive, especially that of data of a qualitative nature, these data provide critical, contextual 
information necessary for meeting the goals of the exercise. 
 
It cannot be emphasised enough that a qualified social scientist should be in charge of, or 
conduct, community profiles. Social scientists are best equipped for evaluating which of the 
various research methods are best geared towards collecting the different types of qualitative and 
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quantitative data required. These scientists also have the training to be cognizant of the themes 
and issues which must be considered when laying out the context and conducting social analyses. 
 
7.3.3 Community Profile Methodology 
A mixed-methods approach is the best for undertaking comprehensive profiling. This is a 
consequence of the nature of profiling, especially fisheries and fishing related ones, which must 
often include a mixture of social, economic, and biological/environmental data found in both 
qualitative and quantitative forms.  
Qualitative data are used in three situations: as description, placing quantitative data in context; 
to explain a situation when quantitative data are unavailable; and in situations when qualitative 
data are the most appropriate. Quantitative data provide a base level of information from which 
to begin an analysis. 
The examples below, from a study of a fishing community in Peterhead, Scotland, (Delaney, 
2009) illustrate the importance of both qualitative and quantitative data.  
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The work of compiling profiles could be undertaken by staff in the contracting authority – e.g., in 
a Ministry, Department of Fisheries, or in an affiliated Science Centre. Alternatively it could be 
done by academics or researchers as utilized in the Japanese fisheries extension service and the 
US Sea Grant Program. The Japanese extension system for fisheries began in 1953. There are 
approximately 460 extension officers, each of them belonging to a prefectural government. 
Fisheries extension officers are “to disseminate fishery technologies, fostering of fishers, as well 
as acting as intermediary between fishers and government.” They work within fishing 
communities, fisheries research centers, and the prefectural government’s fisheries offices. 
Japanese public university researchers also work closely with the research centers.  
The US Sea Grant program is a federal-university partnership program that brings science 
together with communities. The Sea Grant network consists of a federal/university partnership 
between NOAA and 34 university-based programs. The network draws on the expertise of more 
than 3,000 scientists, engineers, public outreach experts, educators and students to help citizens 
better understand, conserve and utilize America's coastal resources. 
Another possibility is for the work to be done through an open tender process via FLAGs or EU 
FarNet activities. 
 
7.3.4 Relevant Concepts, Definitions and Terms in Community Profiling 
The discussion of community profiling requires defining key terms: community; fishing 
community; vulnerability, resilience; well-being; dependence/reliance. 
In order for Community profiling to be undertaken, the community must first be defined. The 
definition of community has been debated by social scientists for decades. For many in fisheries, 
a community is “place-based”. That is, it is a physical location which is often a village, town, or 
city with a port centering the activity. 
Additionally, what constitutes a “fishing” community may have a general meaning; simply a 
delimited locale that has a port and a fishing sector operating out of it. Or, it may have a more 
specific meaning, sometimes even defined by law for fisheries management purposes: “a fishing 
community is defined as a community that is substantially dependent on, or substantially 
engaged, in the harvest or processing of fisheries resources to meet social and economic needs, 
and includes fishing vessel owners, operators, and crew” (Clay and Olson 2007). 
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Vulnerability 
Vulnerability has multiple definitions, depending on the context (e.g., climate change, natural 
hazards, poverty and limited food security). Vulnerability research is often used to identify the 
characteristics of a community (or population) that influence the social burden of risk and 
“susceptibility of a given population, system, or place to harm from exposure to the hazard…” 
(Cutter et al. 2009:2). Further, social vulnerability is centered in both demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of local populations that increase or attenuate the impacts of 
hazard events (Cutter et al. 2009). 
 
Resilience 
Both natural and social sciences emphasize that a system can have multiple stable states and 
that disturbances can force communities to shift from one state to another and still maintain their 
functional characteristics or be resilient (e.g., Peterson et al. 1998; Folke 2006). Social scientists 
usually emphasize a system’s ability to cope and adapt to change, but social systems cannot be 
easily separated from ecological systems. The concept of “social-ecological resilience” attempts to 
capture this interaction (Walker et al., 2004). What is clear is that the interactions between the 
human and non-human environment have synergistic aspects and may adapt or transform over 
time (Folke, 2006). 
 
Well-being 
Well-being is also a key concept if one wants to analyse resilience for, for example, looking into 
social impacts. 
The concept of well-being is well established in the literature as a measure of quality of life. 
Research has demonstrated that secondary measures of well-being and its correlates e.g., 
vulnerability and resilience, can inform us regarding the quality of life of individuals and their 
communities (e.g., Smith and Clay, 2010). The Pollnac et al. (2006[2008]) model (below) 
illustrates the relationship between multiple attributes that directly or indirectly influence well-
being at individual and community levels. 
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Dependence/Reliance 
Jepson & Colburn 2013 developed a useful model in which concepts of vulnerability and resilience 
are linked in relation to events that can impact fishing communities. These events can be directly 
related to fishing (i.e. regulatory change) or be linked to other communal aspects (i.e. school 
closing) or events such as shocks (i.e. hurricane). Resilience refers to how socio-ecological 
systems can ‘have multiple stable states and that disturbances can force communities to shift 
from one state to another and still maintain their functional characteristics or be resilient’ 
(reference made to Peterson et al. 1998 and Folke 2006). In the model Jepson & Colburn 2013 
differentiate between vulnerability as a pre-event condition and resilience is used in the analysis 
of the response of communities to events. 
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7.3.5 Recommended sections in Community Profiles 
This section presents some explanation and descriptions of the suggested requirements in a 
profile, including headings/topics. All sections should include maps, tables, graphs, and photos 
where relevant. 
 Figure 1. Map of Cornouailles in Brittany. Guilvinec Maritime district constitutes the south part of the Bigouden country. 
(Delaney, 2009) 
 
Sections of the Community profiles covered here include: 
- Introduction to the people and the place 
- Social structure  
- Infrastructure and facilities 
- Current economy 
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- Involvement in fisheries 
- Governance 
- Cultural attributes relating to fisheries and the sea 
- Challenges and opportunities 
- Trends and development 
 
 Executive Summary 
Depending on the length of the Community Profile being compiled, an executive summary could 
be useful in that it focuses the main message and key findings and “take aways” in a succinct 
manner. 
 
 Introduction to the People and Place 
In order for community profiling to be undertaken, the community must first be defined. The 
definition of community has been debated by social scientists for decades. For many in fisheries, 
a community is “place-based”. It is a physical location which is often a village, town, or city with a 
port centring the activity. 
Additionally, what constitutes a “fishing” community may have a general meaning; simply a 
delimited locale that has a port and a fishing sector operating out of it. Or, it may have a more 
specific meaning, sometimes even defined by law for fisheries management purposes: “a fishing 
community is defined as a community that is “substantially dependent on, or substantially 
engaged, in the harvest or processing of fisheries resources to meet social and economic needs, 
and includes fishing vessel owners, operators, and crew” (Clay and Olson 2007). 
A fishing community may also be one where fishing related activities are currently less than those 
in an historic period, but it retains an identity or footprint of fishing community.  
One example of this is Løkken in Denmark where the community subsidises some local fishermen 
in order to create an attractive environment for tourists. This shows how fisheries are important 
for the image of the community but it is not actually “dependent” on fishing.  
 
The Introduction to the People and Place should include: 
A brief descriptive overview of the community including its:  
- geography, (including land and sea areas accessed and connected with), 
- history and cultural heritage,  
- main industries/employers, and 
- a description of its overall character (e.g., related maritime history). 
 
An illustrative excerpt from the Peterhead, Scotland, Community Profile is given below as an 
example. 
… Nevertheless, in 2002, 110,000 tons of white fish, shellfish, herring and mackerel 
were landed in Peterhead, valuing more than £70 million. The new, chilled fish 
auction was opened in 2002 and part of the harbour is a large, modern deep-water 
“Harbour of Refuge”. This harbour provides for not only the fishing industry, 
including large pelagic boats, but also the North Sea energy industry and tourist 
cruise ships. 
 The North Sea oil industry has been, since the 1960s, important for 
employment in the region. North Sea oil comes ashore to the south of town, at 
Cruden Bay; North Sea gas is brought ashore at St Fergus immediately to the north. 
The ASCO North Base and South Base located within Peterhead Bay make up the 
largest fully integrated oil service base in the world. 
 As the fishing sector faces a down-turn and significant quota and fleet 
reductions through decommissioning, the energy sector provides an important 
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fallback for men with skills and a good work ethic. The work ethic, and to a lesser 
extent the (previous) religiousness (Calvinist tradition), and the historical cultural 
preference for endogamous relationships and marriage patterns among fishers in 
fishing communities sets them apart from others in the surrounding regions. Farming 
and fishing villages were very distinct in the past with people rarely interacting with 
those outside their community or group. 
 Women have also had a large role to play in Peterhead’s fisher culture. This is 
commemorated by a statue of 'Fisher Jessie' in the centre of town. Carrying a large 
wicker basket of fish on their backs, these 'creel wives' would walk through the 
Buchan countryside selling their wares—an occupation that continued through the 
1950s; this was an activity seen throughout the NE of Scotland (Nadel-Klein 2003). 
Women from the NE area of Scotland are also known to have carried their husbands 
on their backs to get out to the small boats from beaches in order to keep the men 
dry and safe. With these roles, in addition to travelling up and down the coasts to 
gut and salt herring, women therefore have long taken an active role in Peterhead 
fisheries in addition to their supportive role in fishing households. 
 
 Demographic profile 
A description of the demographic profile of the community, and how it compares with the regional 
and national levels should be included. Demographic data should cover the following variables:  
- Population characteristics (disaggregated into age brackets), including:  
o overall population 
o working population 
o education levels 
o nationality 
o income 
 
 Social structure 
Understanding the society and social support structure of the community is important since one 
aspect of resilience and sustainability is community support. Communities differ in the degree to 
which governmental social support is available so a review should be undertaken to understand 
the local situation. 
Governmental support includes the MS’s social security system, including health insurance and 
retirement pension system. The details of who is eligible and what the eligibility and renumeration 
details are important to know. Relevant details include: retirement age; years of working. Other 
aspects of a MS’s social welfare system may include subsidies for low income such as childcare, 
housing and cash payments. Some MS may have alternative systems, such as insurance through 
POs or cooperatives  
Historically, social capital, i.e., networks of people able to lend aid, was often all that was 
available to people and fishing operations in times of crises. Such networks remain important at 
community level. 
An example is given below of how similar information could be presented. This is from a US 
Community Profile of Rockland in Maine (Johnson, Henry and Thompson, 2013) which is overall a 
very useful example of how a community profiling initiative can build up a detailed picture of a 
fishing community without itself being overly lengthy. 
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 Fisheries relevant Infrastructure and Facilities  
An account should be provided of relevant transport and industrial infrastructure in the 
community. This would include port facilities such as shipyards, vessel lifts and cranes, fish 
auction facilities and transport infrastructure such as rail, road and ferry networks, distance to 
airports. 
 
 Current economy  
Employment data for the community as defined should be compiled and analysed focusing on the 
community’s dependency and reliance on the fisheries. Employment should be broken down into 
employment numbers in catching, shoreside, ancillary industries, etc. Where possible incomes for 
these different sectors should also be described and where available compared with regional 
incomes as per the example above from Rockland, Maine. 
For the catching sector the most common employment arrangements for crew should be 
described i.e. are crew mainly share fishermen or on contract and any recent trends in these 
arrangements should be described. 
The issue of occupational pluralism should be examined where possible as in many cases fishing 
may form only part of an individual or family’s income and may be combined with farming or 
other activities.  
 
 Involvement in Fisheries 
A detailed description of fishing and fishing related activities should be provided. This should 
include the size of fleets, numbers of vessels in different categories such as LSF, SSF, 
recreational, and subsistence, most important species targeted, gears used and any significant 
recent changes or trends in the above. Any notable conflicts between different fleets is also an 
important issue to capture. 
 
 Governance (including Law and Policy) 
The organisation of fishing related institutions, such as fishing organizations, unions, producer’s 
organisations, federations should be described. This section should ensure that how small scale 
fisheries interests are represented by collective organisations are covered. Engagement and 
interactions with other levels of governance, regulatory and legal frameworks should be included 
also. 
 
 Cultural Attributes related to fisheries and the Sea  
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This section of the profile should describe key sociocultural attributes related to fisheries, 
maritime-related industries and the sea which set this community apart. These attributes can 
include specific customs and behaviours as well as the existence of special community groups.  
How visible are fisheries and maritime cultural heritage? Are there maritime or fishing related 
museums and monuments? Are there traditional craft (i.e. boats)? Festivals? Are symbols of 
these used locally (e.g., in restaurants, shopping areas) and in tourism? 
Is the character of the community defined by fishing? Are there fishing festivals, blessings of the 
fleet, etc.? Do residents self-describe themselves as being in a fishing community? Do visitors 
describe it as a fishing community? At the individual level, is there a preference for fishing and 
this “way of life”? 
An important commonly-held sociocultural attribute is community as a part of a shared, collective 
identity. Fishing heritage can remain as a part of a shared identity even as the industry shrinks. 
“Communities are defined, in large part by the stories people tell about them. These stories 
provide an account of the community’s origins, history, the character of its people, and what the 
community should look like in the future. The heritage narrative provides a possible starting point 
for the social construction of reality about the community (Bridger 1996). 
 
 Perceptions of challenges and opportunities 
Community profiles should include an assessment of the community’s perceptions of challenges 
and opportunities. This should include the natural as well as the societal, economic and 
governance environments. Challenges or constraints could include issues such as sectoral or fleet 
restructuring, quota allocation changes, loss of support industries, gentrification on-land, conflicts 
at sea (within fisheries and without), COVID-19, etc. 
Opportunities could include related industries such as processing, development of other marine 
natural resources such as seaweeds, offshore energy, changes in governmental policies etc. 
 
 
 
Example of socio-economic, regulatory, and environmental threats (Johnson, 2013b) 
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7.3.6 Conclusions 
EWG 20-14 discussed in greater detail recommendations from EWG 19-03 that both national and 
community profiles should be developed in order to contextualise DCF data. 
 Profiles provide us with more social data than we currently have in order to improve 
management decision-making by including the human/social dimensions of fishing and of the 
CFP.  
 National profiles help us to contextualise the DCF data at a high level – without this context 
DCF variable data only leads to further questions. 
 Community profiles provide information on communities where fisheries have a strong social 
and cultural footprint. This local importance is usually obscured at national level. 
 A time series of community profiles will provide a much more detailed understanding of 
trends and developments within fishing communities than is currently available and which 
reveal the local effects of policy often developed at transnational level.  
The report provides guidance on the elements which should be covered in both profiles.  
 
For National profiles a detailed template is provided with a comprehensive list of descriptors, 
and we outline potential data sources the majority of which are available at sources such as 
Eurostat, DCF, Eurofound.  
National profile descriptors are grouped under 4 main categories or sections:  
 Factsheet (overview of headline facts including inter alia fleet segments, fleet capacity, 
numbers employed, volume and value of landings), 
 Description of main fisheries and fleets (including inter alia main fisheries and fleets, 
geographical areas fished, market and trade, management and governance). 
 Social, cultural and economic aspects of fisheries (including inter alia institutional and legal 
elements, employment, social security and labour aspects, education and training)  
 Trends, issues and development (including inter alia recent history and trends in the 
industry (e.g. development of ports), Constraints, Opportunities) 
We provide some example text, tables and figures where appropriate for the profiles to provide 
additional guidance. 
 
For Community profiles, which is a much more detailed undertaking than the compiling of 
national profiles, the report provides guidance to MS who wish to conduct community profiles. 
The guidelines attempt to ensure that community profiling initiatives across Europe address some 
common issues and questions without being overly prescriptive. A detailed description of the 
desired sections and some methodological advice are provided. The report also includes links to 
examples of good profiles.   
Sections of the Community profiles could include: 
- Introduction to the people and the place 
- Social structure  
- Infrastructure and facilities 
- Current economy 
- Involvement in fisheries 
- Governance 
- Cultural attributes relating to fisheries and the sea 
- Challenges and opportunities 
- Trends and development 
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We outline recommendations on pragmatic solutions to how to resource these profiling initiatives. 
We also provide guidance on the skills required for profiling and outline the necessity for the 
involvement (ideally as part of a team) of a non-economic social scientist. 
The work compiling profiles can be undertaken in a number of ways:  
 Staff on-hand in the contracting authority – e.g., in a Ministry, Department of Fisheries, or 
affiliated Science Center. 
 By collaborating with academics or research institutes – E.g. Japanese Ministry fisheries 
extension service or US Sea Grant Program. 
 Funding for community profiling could potentially be achieved through the EMFAF. 
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